1941.07.07–09.26

Battle of Kiev (1941)

Why was the Soviet Southwestern Front encircled whole east of Kiev in September 1941, and what then befell Kiev and the prisoners?

The fighting at Kiev and east of the Dnieper from July to 26 September 1941 between German Army Groups South and Centre and the Soviet Southwestern Front. When Hitler chose Ukraine over Moscow and turned Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group south, the armour of Guderian and Kleist met at Lokhvitsa on 15–16 September and trapped five Soviet armies. Because Stalin allowed a withdrawal too late, the front commander Kirponos was killed and the Germans announced 665,000 prisoners. Just after the occupation 33,771 Jews were massacred at Babi Yar.

What was the situation of the Southwestern Front before Kiev through the summer?

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Ukraine was defended by Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos's Southwestern Front. The 1st Panzer Group of Army Group South (commanded by Gerd von Rundstedt) destroyed most of the Southwestern Front's mechanized corps in the tank battle of Dubno, Lutsk and Rovno at the end of June, and Walter von Reichenau's German 6th Army closed in on Kiev. Kiev was the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the meeting point of the great Dnieper bridges and railways. West of the city lay the Kiev Fortified Region along the Irpen river, and on 23 July a new 37th Army was formed to hold it. 1 2

From 11 July Mikhail Potapov's 5th Army struck the German northern flank around Korosten and slowed the German 6th Army, while in the south the German 1st Panzer Group, instead of going straight for Kiev, swung south-east and in early August encircled and destroyed the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies at Uman. On 4 August the German XXIX Corps made its first assault on the Kiev Fortified Region, but the Soviet 37th Army and airborne brigades counter-attacked from 10 August and restored the line by the 16th. Ivan Bagramyan, then chief of operations of the Southwestern Front, wrote in his memoirs that an old worker building a barricade in the city told him, "If the fascists break through, we will all, to the last man, go out to the barricades." On 16 August Army Group South suspended the attack on Kiev, reporting that its exhausted infantry could attack no further. 1 3

Meanwhile the situation north of Kiev changed. After repeated requests from Budyonny and Kirponos, the Stavka on 19 August allowed the 5th Army to fall back to a shorter line. But the German 6th Army followed and on 23 August seized the wooden bridge over the Dnieper at Okuninovo. Kirponos ordered every aircraft he had to destroy it, and Il-2 attack aircraft burned it with incendiary bombs, cutting off the Germans who had crossed for ten days. At the same time the German 2nd Army took Gomel on 20 August, breaking through the Stalin Line, and Guderian's armour had come down as far as Starodub. The northern flank of the Southwestern Front was beginning to open from above. 4 1

The Stavka had already worried about that northern flank on 23 July, when it combined the badly weakened 13th and 21st Armies into the Central Front under Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov to hold the Sozh river and the Gomel region. But this front was pushed back and broke under the attacks of the German 2nd Army and Guderian in August. On 26 August the XVII Corps of the German 6th Army took Chernobyl, 110 kilometres north of Kiev. By the end of August the Southwestern Front, more than fifty divisions in six armies, formed a triangle with its apex west of Kiev and a depth of 500 kilometres. Its two long sides were pressed from the north by the German 2nd Panzer Group and 2nd Army, from the west by the 6th Army and from the south by the 1st Panzer Group and 17th Army, and its strongest formations, massed in the west, could not meet the armour on the outer flanks. English Wikipedia sums up that Kirponos knew his position but the high command's approach left him unable to act. 4

Why did Hitler turn the armour on Kiev, and how did Guderian drive south?

The German army high command wanted to concentrate Army Group Centre against Moscow, but on 20 August Hitler rejected the proposal and on the 21st signed an order turning Army Group Centre's 2nd Army and Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group south to encircle and destroy the Southwestern Front together with Army Group South. He wanted first to take Ukraine's grain and raw materials, the industry of the Donbas, and the Crimea, from which Romanian oil could be threatened. The quarrel within the German command over this decision and Guderian's meeting with Hitler on 23 August are covered in Battle of Smolensk (1941). The plan was for Guderian, coming down from the north, and Ewald von Kleist's 1st Panzer Group, coming up from the Kremenchug bridgehead in the south, to meet hundreds of kilometres east of Kiev and trap five Soviet armies between the Dnieper and the Desna. 1 2 4

Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group resumed its advance south on 25 August, and that day Walter Model's 3rd Panzer Division reached Novgorod-Seversky on the Desna and took the bridge. But Guderian complained in his memoirs that, contrary to Hitler's promise, Army Group Centre kept the XLVI Motorized Corps in reserve, so that he had to set out on the new campaign "with only two corps". He asked repeatedly for reinforcements between 26 and 29 August, and Bock, needing a mobile reserve for Army Group Centre's long defensive line, refused most of them. Bock noted on 2 September that Guderian had described his situation so pessimistically that he considered seeking permission for a tactical withdrawal. 4 5

The Soviet Stavka saw Guderian's southward drive as a threat. On 16 August it formed the Bryansk Front under Andrei Yeryomenko to strike the flank of the Germans moving south, and Stalin and Boris Shaposhnikov told the Southwestern Front they hoped "to stop the German advance". But the Bryansk Front's counter-offensive towards Roslavl and Novozybkov from late August to early September failed. Alexander Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs that a German counter-blow around Novgorod-Seversky widened the gap between the Soviet 13th and 21st Armies to 60–75 kilometres. Through that gap Guderian's tanks drove south towards the Seim river. 6 4 3

On 7 September the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions established bridgeheads south of the Seim, and Guderian's headquarters moved to Konotop. The 3rd Panzer Division took Romny on 10 September. In the south Kleist's 1st Panzer Group attacked north out of the Kremenchug bridgehead on 12 September and took Lubny. On 14 September a small battle group from Model's 3rd Panzer Division, about three tanks and eight armoured reconnaissance vehicles, seized Lokhvitsa and its bridge over the Sula, and Guderian wrote that he drove through the mud and "with nightfall was already at Lokhvitsa with Model". Russian Wikipedia says the ring closed on 15 September; English Wikipedia says the 3rd Panzer Division and Kleist's 16th Panzer Division were fully joined south of Lokhvitsa on 16 September. 5 4 1 2

The German armour that closed the ring was itself worn out. Guderian recorded that the 6th Panzer Regiment, which he visited on 15 September, had only ten tanks left: one Panzer IV, three Panzer IIIs and six Panzer IIs. Outside the pocket the Red Army tried from 18 September to retake Romny with Pavel Belov's cavalry-mechanized group, and Guderian, feeling threatened, moved his headquarters back to Konotop on the 19th. The Germans held on, helped by the ground at Romny where the Sula meets its tributary, and the Soviet attacks from outside went on until 23–24 September without opening the pocket. 5 1

Why did Stalin refuse until the end to allow a withdrawal from Kiev?

According to English Wikipedia the gist of Zhukov's report to Stalin that day was that a German advance straight on Leningrad or Moscow looked unlikely and that the Central Front around Gomel was the Red Army's weakest point. He proposed giving the Central Front three armies, from the strategic reserve and from the Western and Southwestern Fronts, and putting Nikolai Vatutin in command. When Stalin objected that this would weaken the defence of Moscow, Zhukov answered that nine fully equipped divisions could be brought from the Far East within two weeks, but Stalin feared a Japanese attack. After leaving the General Staff Zhukov took command of the Reserve Front and led the Yelnya counter-offensive. 4

The idea of giving up Kiev was raised early. Georgy Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that on 29 July, as Chief of the General Staff, he told Stalin the whole Southwestern Front must be pulled back behind the Dnieper. When Stalin asked, "And what about Kiev?", Zhukov answered, "Kiev will have to be abandoned," and Stalin flared up: "How could you think of handing Kiev to the enemy?" When Zhukov said that in that case he would resign and go to the front, Stalin, half an hour later, removed him as Chief of the General Staff and appointed Shaposhnikov. The exchange rests on Zhukov's recollection alone and its wording cannot be confirmed from other records, but it is often cited as testimony to how heavily Stalin weighed abandoning Kiev. 7

As the danger became visible in September, the Southwestern Front and the commander of the Southwestern Direction, Semyon Budyonny, asked again and again to withdraw. On 7 September Kirponos asked to pull the forces north of Kiev back east of the Desna, and on 9 September the Stavka allowed only the 5th Army and the right wing of the 37th to fall back. According to Vasilevsky, on 11 September Stalin spoke to Kirponos by teleprinter himself, with Timoshenko present, saying that withdrawing at once without first preparing a line on the Psel would itself lead to encirclement, and ordering counter-attacks against the enemy at Konotop. He ended: "Do not abandon Kiev and do not blow the bridges without the Stavka's permission." Budyonny, who had cabled that a withdrawal was "fully ripe", was removed on 13 September, and Timoshenko became commander of the Southwestern Direction. 4 6

Vasily Tupikov, chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, wrote in a report to Shaposhnikov that the Germans were entering Romny and Lokhvitsa almost unopposed and that "the beginning of the catastrophe you know of is a matter of a couple of days". Vasilevsky dates the report 13 September; English Wikipedia describes it as a personal telegram sent early on 14 September. Stalin had Shaposhnikov reply that Tupikov had sent "a panicky report" and that every commander must calmly hold his ground. Vasilevsky recalled that until 17 September Stalin not only refused to accept but would not even seriously consider the proposals to withdraw, because he underestimated the threat of encirclement and placed too much faith in the flank attacks of the Bryansk and other fronts. 6 4

On 16 September Timoshenko met Bagramyan at Poltava and, saying the decision to withdraw had to be made while the German ring was still thin, sent him by air to Kirponos at Piryatin with a verbal order to abandon the Kiev Fortified Region and pull the main forces back to the Psel. But Timoshenko would not put in writing an order that ran against Stalin's wishes, and Kirponos, mindful of Stalin's instructions, said he could not leave Kiev without a written directive. Shaposhnikov's confirmation came on the night of 17 September, but according to English Wikipedia it allowed only the abandonment of Kiev, not a retreat all the way to the Psel. Vasilevsky writes that Stalin permitted the abandonment of Kiev that day, and Russian Wikipedia sums up that Kirponos had himself ordered his armies to break out eastwards on the evening of the 17th, minutes before communications were lost. By then the ring had already closed. 4 2 6

What happened to the Southwestern Front and Kirponos inside the pocket?

On the night of 18 September the front headquarters ordered a breakout, but communications between the headquarters, the armies and the Stavka were soon cut. The 5th, 37th and 26th Armies and parts of the 21st and 38th were encircled, and the troops broke up into many small groups each trying to fight its way east. The 37th Army, retreating from Kiev, was in the worst position: coming towards it were the infantry divisions of the German 2nd Army, which had passed through the collapsed front of the 5th and 21st. The German 6th Army entered Kiev on 19 September, but fighting inside the pocket went on until around 24 September, the last large masses being the 26th Army west of Orzhitsa and remnants of the 5th and 26th between Piryatin and Lokhvitsa. 6 4 1

On the evening of 20 September a combined column of the Southwestern Front and 5th Army headquarters reached the hamlet of Dryukovshchina, 15 kilometres south-west of Lokhvitsa, and was attacked by the main body of the German 3rd Panzer Division. Having lost several guns and armoured cars, the column fell back into the Shumeikovo grove. According to Russian Wikipedia Kirponos was wounded in this fight, his shin bone shattered, and a few hours later was killed by a shell fragment to the head. Mikhail Burmistenko, member of the front's military council and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the chief of staff Tupikov were also killed that day; the 5th Army commander Potapov was captured by the Germans and the 5th Army chief of staff D. S. Pisarevsky was killed. 8 9 2 1

Kirponos was born into a Ukrainian peasant family, was conscripted in the First World War, joined the Red Army in 1917 and fought in the Civil War as a Bolshevik. He was made a Hero of the Soviet Union for leading a division in the 1939–40 war with Finland, and in February 1941 became commander of the Kiev Special Military District. English Wikipedia writes that on the night of 21 June, despite instructions not to react to rumours, he kept his troops alert, so that the Southwestern Front was not caught as flat-footed as the Western Front. Contemporaries judged him differently. Halder noted in his diary on 26 June that the enemy facing Army Group South was firmly and energetically led, while Konstantin Rokossovsky, then commanding a mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, recalled that Kirponos was visibly at a loss and seemed not to know the situation, a man not up to so heavy a responsibility. Kirponos's remains were buried near the grove, moved to Kiev in December 1943 and reburied in the Park of Eternal Glory in 1957. 8 9

Part of the headquarters led by Bagramyan, the 21st Army headquarters and part of the airborne brigades escaped the pocket. Budyonny, Timoshenko and the military council member Nikita Khrushchev, who formed the command of the Southwestern Direction, were outside the ring and got clear of the danger zone by aircraft, since the Germans had not completely closed the sky. With the troops who broke out and new arrivals the Southwestern Front soon re-formed the 21st, 38th and 40th Armies and set up a new front around Mirgorod and Poltava and along the Psel and Sula. According to Vasilevsky the Stavka shortly afterwards abolished the Southwestern Direction and gave Timoshenko the Southwestern Front directly. 1 4 2

How many prisoners were taken, and why do the figures differ?

The encirclement battle ended on 26 September. Army Group South announced some 665,000 prisoners and 884 tanks, 418 anti-tank guns and 3,018 guns captured or destroyed (English Wikipedia gives 824 tanks). Soviet and Russian counts differ. By the figures of Krivosheev's team the Southwestern Front lost 700,544 men in the whole Kiev defensive operation from 7 July to 26 September, 616,304 of them killed, missing or captured. Russian Wikipedia gives 452,700 men inside the ring at the moment of encirclement and total losses of about half a million. 1 4 2

Because the figures count different periods and groups, they cannot simply be set against each other. The German announcement counts those captured in and around the pocket during September; Krivosheev's figure is the Southwestern Front's loss from its rolls over the two and a half months of the whole operation; and 452,700 is the strength inside the ring when it closed. English Wikipedia's article on Operation Barbarossa adds that while the Germans claimed 665,000 prisoners, the real figure was probably around 220,000, so the German announcement itself may have been inflated. Read either way, an entire front had vanished in one of the largest encirclements of the war. Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs that the Germans lost more than 100,000 men in the fighting for Kiev, but this is a Soviet estimate, not a figure confirmed from German records. 1 2 6 16

The fate of those taken prisoner was terrible. When the encirclements of Kiev, Vyazma and Bryansk in September and October produced nearly a million and a half prisoners at once, the already makeshift arrangements broke down. Prisoners were marched hundreds of kilometres with little or no food or water, and those who could not walk were shot by the roadside. By the end of 1941, 81 camps had been set up on occupied Soviet territory, most of them fenced open ground. About two million of the Soviet prisoners in German hands died before January 1942. 10

What this victory left the Germans is still debated. It opened the way to eastern Ukraine, the Sea of Azov and the Donbas, and, seeing the Red Army's huge losses, the German command concluded that Moscow could still be taken despite the late season and launched Operation Typhoon (1941); German Wikipedia judges that conclusion mistaken. From the Soviet side, as Vasilevsky put it, the Southwestern Front held part of Army Group Centre in the south for more than a month and so bought time to prepare the defence of Moscow. Whether the two months spent on Kiev brought on the defeat before Moscow, or whether going to Moscow with the Soviet forces in the south left intact would have been more dangerous, remains disputed in studies of the Battle of Moscow. 1 11 6

English Wikipedia judges Kiev an unprecedented defeat for the Red Army, more damaging than Minsk and Smolensk. The German gains were large too. The same article writes that during the eight weeks of the Kiev fighting Army Group Centre rested its worn-out units and put its supply in order, and its infantry divisions caught up with the armour. The mass of equipment captured around Kiev let the Wehrmacht advance without waiting for resupply. The Soviet Bryansk Front, meanwhile, which had tried to stop Guderian's drive south, lost about 100,000 soldiers and 140 tanks out of an initial 260,000 men and 260 tanks, and when the German offensive on Moscow began less than three weeks later it had only 200,000 men left. The Soviets had to rebuild the Southwestern Front from scratch and draw forces from the central sector to fill the gap in the south. 4

What happened in occupied Kiev, and how was the Babi Yar massacre carried out?

Retreating Soviet forces had hidden radio-detonated explosives in large buildings of Kiev. The German 6th Army headquarters had already ordered on 13 September that troops not stay in the city centre without permission, and on the 19th an anonymous tip-off led to the discovery of some of the charges. But from 24 September buildings of the occupation authorities on Khreshchatyk, the main street, exploded one after another, and the fire was put out only on the 29th. The explosions and fire killed many inhabitants as well as German soldiers. Hitler then ordered that large cities were not to be entered directly but surrounded and reduced by shelling and bombing. 1 12 13

In a supplement to Directive No. 34 of 12 August Hitler had ordered Kiev's complete destruction. But as there was no fighting in the city, it was left largely intact, to Hitler's fury. The first explosion on Khreshchatyk also killed inhabitants who had come to the German field command to hand in banned items, and the Nazi authorities used the explosions and fire as a pretext for the Babi Yar massacre. Unable to raze the city, the German leadership set out to starve it under the Hunger Plan, officially blaming the shortages on Soviet economic policy. Fear of an uprising behind the lines held this policy back, and Kiev was forcibly emptied, looted and burned only when the Germans withdrew in September to November 1943. 4 14

On 26 September, in the office of Kiev's city commandant Major General Kurt Eberhard, the Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln, the commander of Einsatzgruppe C Otto Rasch and the commander of its Sonderkommando 4a Paul Blobel met and decided, as "retaliation" for the explosions, to kill all the Jews of Kiev. Eberhard had been appointed city commandant by Hans von Obstfelder, commander of the XXIX Army Corps of the German 6th Army. On 27–28 September some 2,000 notices were posted across the city ordering the Jews to assemble at 8 a.m. on the 29th with their documents and valuables. The Einsatzgruppe report noted that these wall posters had overcome the difficulties of so large an action. 15 13 12

On 29 and 30 September, in the Babi Yar ravine north-west of the city, Sonderkommando 4a and Order Police Battalion 45 shot people with machine guns, helped by Waffen-SS men, Order Police Battalion 303 and Ukrainian auxiliary police. The Einsatzgruppe's operational situation report recorded 33,771 Jews from Kiev and its suburbs shot dead. English Wikipedia writes that, contrary to the myth of the "clean Wehrmacht", Reichenau's 6th Army worked with the SS and SD to plan and carry out the massacre, and German Wikipedia quotes an SS report to Berlin: "The Wehrmacht welcomes the measures and requests radical action." Ten days later Reichenau issued the Reichenau Order. 13 15 1

Babi Yar went on being used as a killing site for two more years, and between 100,000 and 150,000 people are estimated to have been murdered there during the occupation. Besides Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Roma, communists and Ukrainian nationalists died there. As the Red Army approached in 1943, Blobel had the bodies dug up and burned in "Sonderaktion 1005" to erase the traces. Blobel was sentenced to death at the Einsatzgruppen trial at Nuremberg, Jeckeln was tried by a Soviet military tribunal in Riga and hanged in 1946, and Eberhard killed himself in American custody in 1947. Kiev stayed occupied for 778 days until the Red Army liberated it on 6 November 1943. 13 15 1

After the war the Soviet Union, emphasising the shared sacrifice of all its nationalities, called the dead of Babi Yar "peaceful victims of fascism" and did not state on its memorials that Jews and Roma had been murdered as such. So Yevgeny Yevtushenko's 1961 poem "Babi Yar" begins "Over Babi Yar there are no monuments", the line that also opens Dmitri Shostakovich's Symphony No. 13. Dina Pronicheva, an actress of the Kiev puppet theatre who survived Babi Yar by jumping into the pile of bodies before she was shot and playing dead, became widely known through Anatoly Kuznetsov's documentary novel Babi Yar. Memorials naming the Jewish victims were erected only after the Soviet Union collapsed. 13

Consequences

The Southwestern Front was virtually destroyed and Kiev stayed occupied until November 1943. Germany opened the way to eastern Ukraine and the Donbas, but the attack on Moscow was put off to the end of September. By the Soviet and Russian count the Southwestern Front lost 700,544 men (616,304 killed, missing or captured).

Timeline & Map

Kiev Konotop Romny Babi Yar Lokhvitsa Shumeikovo grove 1 Moscow 3 Wolfsschanze 4 Novgorod-Seversky 5 Konotop 15 Babi Yar 6 Kiev 11 Kiev 13 Khreshchatyk 8 Lokhvitsa 14 Lokhvitsa 2 Kiev Fortified Region 9 south of Lokhvitsa 12 Shumeikovo grove 10 Piryatin 7 Poltava
  1. 11941.07.29Soviet Union
    Zhukov proposes leaving Kiev

    Zhukov, by his own account, told Stalin the Southwestern Front must be pulled back behind the Dnieper and was removed as Chief of the General Staff.

  2. 21941.08.04GermanySoviet Union
    First assault on the Kiev Fortified Region

    The German XXIX Corps attacked the fortified region south-west of Kiev; the Soviet 37th Army counter-attacked from 10 August and restored the line.

  3. 31941.08.21Germany
    Hitler orders the turn south

    Hitler signed the order turning part of Army Group Centre south to encircle the Southwestern Front.

  4. 41941.08.25GermanySoviet Union
    2nd Panzer Group drives south

    Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group began its drive south, and the 3rd Panzer Division reached Novgorod-Seversky on the Desna.

  5. 51941.09.07GermanySoviet Union
    Seim crossed

    The German 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions set up bridgeheads south of the Seim. Kirponos asked to withdraw his forces north of Kiev.

  6. 61941.09.11Soviet Union
    Stalin orders Kiev held

    Stalin told Kirponos by teleprinter not to abandon Kiev and not to blow the bridges without permission.

  7. 71941.09.13Soviet Union
    Budyonny removed

    Budyonny, who had asked for a withdrawal, was removed as commander of the Southwestern Direction and replaced by Timoshenko.

  8. 81941.09.14GermanySoviet Union
    Lokhvitsa taken

    A battle group of Model's 3rd Panzer Division seized Lokhvitsa and the Sula bridge, while Kleist's forces came up to Lubny from the south.

  9. 91941.09.15GermanySoviet Union
    The ring closes

    Guderian's and Kleist's armour met around Lokhvitsa, encircling four armies of the Southwestern Front.

  10. 101941.09.17Soviet Union
    Withdrawal from Kiev allowed

    Only that night did the Stavka allow Kiev to be abandoned, and the front headquarters ordered its armies to break out eastwards.

  11. 111941.09.19GermanySoviet Union
    Kiev falls

    The German 6th Army entered Kiev.

  12. 121941.09.20GermanySoviet Union
    Kirponos killed

    Attacked by the German 3rd Panzer Division at Dryukovshchina, the headquarters column fell back into the Shumeikovo grove, where Kirponos, Tupikov and Burmistenko were killed.

  13. 131941.09.24GermanySoviet Union
    Khreshchatyk explosions

    Buildings on Kiev's main street blew up one after another from charges left by the Soviets, starting a great fire.

  14. 141941.09.26GermanySoviet Union
    Encirclement battle ends

    Organised resistance inside the pocket ended. The same day the city commandant Eberhard, Jeckeln and others decided on the murder of the Jews.

  15. 151941.09.29–30GermanySoviet Union
    Babi Yar massacre

    Sonderkommando 4a and police battalions shot 33,771 Jews of Kiev in the Babi Yar ravine.

Related people 19

Soviet Union (Red Army)11

Related terms

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16