1945.01.12–02.03

The Vistula–Oder Offensive

How did the Red Army advance from the Vistula to the Oder in three weeks in January 1945, and what happened along the way to Warsaw and Auschwitz, to the Poles and to German civilians?

The offensive of 12 January to early February 1945 in which the Soviet 1st Belorussian Front (Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian Front (Konev) broke out of three bridgeheads on the Vistula, destroyed German Army Group A and advanced some 500 kilometres to the Oder. Warsaw, Kraków and Łódź were liberated, the prisoners left in Auschwitz were freed, and the Silesian industrial district changed hands almost undamaged. Soviet troops seized bridgeheads at Küstrin, a little over 70 kilometres from Berlin, but halted there because of their exposed northern flank.

Soviet UnionGermanyPolandWhat was the Vistula–Oder offensive, and how did the Vistula front stand in the autumn of 1944?

The Vistula–Oder offensive was the great offensive the Soviet Red Army fought in central and southern Poland from 12 January to early February 1945. The 1st Belorussian Front under Marshal Georgy Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front under Marshal Ivan Konev (a "front" was a Soviet formation of several armies, roughly an army group) burst out of three bridgeheads they had held on the western bank of the Vistula (German Weichsel) and in a little over three weeks advanced some 500 kilometres to the Oder (Polish Odra) in eastern Germany. Russian Wikipedia dates the operation from 12 January to 3 February and sums it up as twenty days in which Soviet troops advanced 20 to 30 kilometres a day, crossing seven German defence lines and two large rivers. Warsaw was liberated on 17 January, Kraków and Łódź on the 19th, and on 27 January the prisoners still left in the Auschwitz camps were freed. Poznań was encircled, and the industrial district of Silesia (German Schlesien, Polish Śląsk) fell into Soviet hands almost undamaged. In early February Zhukov's spearheads seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder in front of Küstrin (today Kostrzyn nad Odrą in Poland), a little over 70 kilometres from Berlin. 2 1

The offensive grew out of a stand-off that had lasted almost half a year. After Operation Bagration destroyed the German Army Group Centre in the summer of 1944, the 1st Belorussian Front seized two bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula south of Warsaw, at Magnuszew and Puławy, between late July and early August. Further south the 1st Ukrainian Front ended the Lvov–Sandomierz offensive holding a large bridgehead at Sandomierz (the Baranów bridgehead in German accounts), some 200 kilometres from Warsaw. Meanwhile the Warsaw Uprising, begun on 1 August, was crushed in early October, and the Germans systematically demolished the surrendered city; the dispute over the uprising and the conduct of the Soviet troops halted east of the Vistula belongs to the entry on the Warsaw Uprising. In his memoir Reminiscences and Reflections Zhukov wrote that in the autumn of 1944 he judged the continuing attacks north of Warsaw, towards Modlin and on the Narew, to be wearing the troops down for nothing, and asked Stalin to stop them, saying that "this offensive will give us nothing but casualties". According to Sergei Shtemenko, then head of the Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, by the end of October Stalin too had given up hope of liberating Warsaw quickly, and on 12 November the Stavka (the Soviet supreme command) ordered the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front onto the defensive. For almost three months the Vistula front was quiet while both sides prepared for the next battle. 1 25 31

The command changed in the meantime. On 16 November 1944 Stalin put his deputy as Supreme Commander, Zhukov, at the head of the 1st Belorussian Front. Shtemenko writes that the decision was meant to give the army that would take the German capital to the most experienced commander. Konstantin Rokossovsky, who had led the front until then and had been working out the offensive south of Warsaw, moved north to the 2nd Belorussian Front. In his memoir A Soldier's Duty Rokossovsky recalls that when Stalin telephoned him around 12 November he asked back: "What have I done to be moved from the main axis to a secondary sector?" Stalin replied that his sector belonged to one operation in which three fronts would advance west together, and that "if you and Konev do not advance, Zhukov will not advance anywhere either". Stalin took over the coordination of the four fronts on the Berlin axis himself, and Aleksandr Vasilevsky, who had been coordinating the 3rd Belorussian Front, was left with only the two Baltic fronts. 30 27

Soviet UnionHow did the Soviet General Staff and the two fronts plan the winter offensive?

According to Shtemenko's memoir, the outline of the winter campaign of 1945 was drawn up at the General Staff between late October and early November 1944. The reckoning was that Germany could be defeated in forty-five days of offensive operations to a depth of 600 to 700 kilometres, in two stages (fifteen days and thirty days) run together without an operational pause. Since the German forces holding East Prussia could strike the northern flank of a Soviet drive on Berlin, the 3rd Belorussian Front was to attack Königsberg from the east while the 2nd Belorussian Front swung round from the south to cut the group off from the Reich: this became the East Prussian offensive of 1945. The main blow fell to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, which already held bridgeheads on the Vistula; they were to tear a gap in the German front and drive west fast, and were packed with tank armies and independent tank corps. This time the commanders were not gathered for a joint conference but called to the General Staff one by one to settle their own front's plan, and at a Stavka meeting after the 7 November revolution holiday it was agreed that the offensive on the main axis would begin on 20 January 1945. The operational plans themselves were approved only at the end of December. 30

Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front placed its main blow in the Magnuszew bridgehead: the 5th Shock, 61st and 8th Guards Armies and the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies were to break out westward there, while from the Puławy bridgehead the 69th and 33rd Armies struck towards Radom and Łódź. Warsaw was not to be attacked head-on but taken by envelopment, the 47th Army from the north and the 61st Army and the Polish 1st Army under Stanisław Popławski from the south. Vasily Chuikov, commander of the 8th Guards Army, writes in his memoir The End of the Third Reich that the plan presented by the front's chief of staff Mikhail Malinin was to reach the Łódź line on the tenth to twelfth day and then advance towards Poznań. According to Zhukov, the operation was at first called the Warsaw–Poznań operation and acquired the name Vistula–Oder only after the front reached the Oder near Küstrin. 25 28

Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was to deliver its main blow westward from the Sandomierz bridgehead towards Breslau (today Wrocław) and take the Silesian industrial district with its left wing. In his memoir The Year 1945 Konev gives the front's strength as about 1.2 million men, 3,660 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 17,000 guns and mortars and 2,580 aircraft, in eight combined-arms armies and two tank armies, among them Pavel Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army and Dmitry Lelyushenko's 4th Tank Army. He recalls that when he presented the plan in Moscow at the end of November, Stalin ran his finger round the Silesian industrial district on the map and said a single word: "Gold." Konev writes that he already meant to take the district with as little damage as possible because it would go to Poland after the war, which is why the attacks were routed north and south of it from the start. Shtemenko likewise records that, after repeated discussions with Konev, the General Staff chose to bypass Silesia from the north-east and north, to avoid drawn-out fighting and needless losses among the massive stone buildings of Upper Silesia. 26 30

An enormous weight of fire was gathered in the Sandomierz bridgehead. According to Konev, on the breakthrough sectors 250 to 280 guns, and in places 300, stood on every kilometre of front, not counting small-calibre guns and mortars. The core of the plan was to break the German defences at a single stroke on the first day and push both tank armies into the gap that same day; Konev called it "flinging open the gates" for the tank armies. The German side had its own weaknesses. On Hitler's orders the two German defence lines were placed close together, and the armoured reserves, among them the XXIV Panzer Corps (16th and 17th Panzer Divisions), were stationed just behind the front, within range of Soviet artillery. In his memoir Konev called this disposition a blunder unworthy of German generals, while adding that the reserves would not have collapsed in the first few hours had Soviet artillery not fired so densely and so deep. 26 1 2

GermanySoviet UnionWhy could the Germans not stop this offensive?

The two fronts were overwhelmingly strong. English Wikipedia credits them with 163 divisions, 2,203,000 infantry, 4,529 tanks, 2,513 assault guns, 13,763 field guns of 76 mm and above, 14,812 mortars and 5,000 aircraft; Russian Wikipedia counts more than 2.2 million men, 36,436 guns and mortars, 7,049 tanks and self-propelled guns and 4,772 aircraft. Facing them was the German Army Group A under Colonel-General Josef Harpe: the 9th Army around Warsaw, the 4th Panzer Army opposite the Sandomierz bridgehead and the 17th Army to the south. English Wikipedia puts its strength at 450,000 men, 4,100 guns and 1,150 tanks; Russian Wikipedia at up to 560,000 men, about 5,000 guns and mortars, 1,220 tanks and assault guns and 630 aircraft. English Wikipedia judges the real ratio at about five to one. A report by Reinhard Gehlen, head of Foreign Armies East, the German army's intelligence branch on the Soviet Union, reckoned the Soviet superiority at the start of the offensive at 11 to 1 in infantry, 7 to 1 in tanks and 20 to 1 in artillery and aircraft. In front of the Sandomierz bridgehead the 4th Panzer Army lacked the infantry for a continuous line and had to hold parts of its sector with isolated strongpoints. 1 2

The acting Chief of the German Army General Staff, Heinz Guderian, took Gehlen's assessment to Hitler. According to German Wikipedia, on 9 January, after touring the Eastern Front, he came to Hitler's headquarters near Frankfurt am Main and demanded that Italy, Norway, the Balkans and Courland be given up and every reserve that could be found be gathered to keep the Russians out of Germany. The Eastern Front had hardly been reinforced since the autumn of 1944: between the Baltic and the Carpathians stood only 75 of Germany's 287 divisions, and weaker ones than in the West. Guderian also proposed evacuating Army Group North, trapped on the Courland peninsula in Latvia, by sea to reinforce the defence, but Hitler forbade it. Hitler refused to believe the estimates of Soviet strength; according to English Wikipedia he scoffed at them as "the greatest bluff since Genghis Khan". He also forbade any withdrawal. 1 3

Germany's armoured reserves were tied down elsewhere. The 5th and 6th Panzer Armies had gone into the Ardennes offensive in the west, launched on 16 December 1944. When Soviet forces encircled the Hungarian capital Budapest at the end of December, Hitler pulled the IV SS Panzer Corps, which had been fighting as part of Army Group A around Modlin north of Warsaw, out to the south for the Budapest relief attempts (Operation Konrad, 1 to 17 January). The 6th (SS) Panzer Army, withdrawn from the Ardennes, likewise went not to the Eastern Front but to Hungary. German Wikipedia says Hitler took this decision on 12 January without Guderian's knowledge; English Wikipedia's article on Operation Spring Awakening dates Hitler's commitment to 22 January. Hitler gave priority to defending the oilfields of Hungary and the Vienna region, which held 80 per cent of the reserves left to him. 5 3 6

How far the Ardennes offensive eased the Soviet victory has long been argued. Russian Wikipedia summarises the dispute: some Western historians hold that the loss of the German panzer armies in the Ardennes made the Vistula–Oder offensive much easier, while Russian historiography replies that not a single division or brigade was taken from the Eastern Front for the Ardennes and that, on the contrary, the Soviet January offensive relieved the Allies there. Konev entered the argument in his memoir. Citing German general staff figures, he wrote that between October and December 1944 Germany moved only five and a half divisions from east to west, while in the same period it reinforced the east with 25 divisions and 11 brigades drawn from other fronts, so that when the Vistula–Oder offensive began there were 75½ divisions in the West and 179 in the East. Konev's 179 divisions cover the whole Eastern Front including Hungary; the 75 divisions above count only the sector from the Baltic to the Carpathians. 2 26

GermanySoviet UnionHow far did the German Army General Staff foresee the offensive, and why were its warnings not heeded?

Heinz Guderian, acting Chief of the German Army General Staff from 21 July 1944, described these weeks at length in his 1951 memoir, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Panzer Leader). For the meetings and the words spoken in them his account is often the only record, and the book also defends its author by laying the defeat at Hitler's door. The scenes below are therefore given as his account and set beside other sources. According to Guderian, on 24 December, when the Ardennes offensive had in effect failed, he went to Hitler's western headquarters at Ziegenberg and reported the assessment of Foreign Armies East, the Army General Staff's Soviet intelligence branch under Reinhard Gehlen. The Red Army was massing its main forces in three places, the Sandomierz (Baranów) bridgehead, north of Warsaw and on the East Prussian border, and Foreign Armies East expected the offensive to open on 12 January. Hitler dismissed this as bluff, saying that Soviet rifle divisions had at most 7,000 men and their tank corps had no tanks. Guderian places Hitler's words about "the greatest bluff since Genghis Khan" at this briefing. At dinner Heinrich Himmler, seated next to him, told him: "I don't believe the Russians will attack at all." Alfred Jodl, chief of the Wehrmacht operations staff at the OKW, refused to give up the initiative he believed had been won in the West and on 1 January opened a new offensive in northern Alsace. 32

On New Year's Eve Guderian went back to Ziegenberg, obtained from the Commander-in-Chief West, Gerd von Rundstedt, the numbers of four divisions that could be pulled out at once, and won Hitler's consent; Hitler then sent even these four to Hungary, he wrote. Between 5 and 8 January he toured Hungary and the headquarters of Army Group A in Kraków. Its commander, Josef Harpe, proposed giving up the Vistula positions just before the Soviet attack and falling back some 20 kilometres to a shorter line so as to free reserves, and Georg-Hans Reinhardt, commanding Army Group Centre in East Prussia, proposed abandoning the Narew positions. On 9 January Guderian returned to Ziegenberg with Gehlen's maps comparing the forces. According to the memoir, Hitler called them "completely idiotic" and demanded that their author be sent to a lunatic asylum at once, and Guderian replied that if Gehlen was to be locked up, he should be sent along with him. Harpe's and Reinhardt's proposals were rejected. When Hitler said the Eastern Front had never had so many reserves, Guderian, by his account, answered that with twelve and a half divisions in reserve for a 1,200-kilometre front it was "like a house of cards": a break at a single point would bring the whole front down. 32

Other sources correct this picture at several points. German Wikipedia writes that Guderian said he would not put Army Group A's plan for a tactical withdrawal to Hitler, so that the army group, held to a strategy of standing fast, collapsed. After the offensive began he blocked or backed Hitler's refusal of Reinhardt's requests to withdraw on 15, 17 and 20 January, and the command of Army Group Centre felt that as Chief of the General Staff he was taking Hitler's side. The historian Richard Lakowski reads Guderian's requests for reinforcements in this period less as reasoned proposals than as self-deception and tactics towards Hitler. Nor were the assessments of Foreign Armies East as "absolutely reliable" as the memoir says. According to German Wikipedia's article on the branch, the American military historian David Glantz calculated that the Soviet forces were 30 to 40 per cent stronger than Foreign Armies East had predicted, and the branch, taken in by Soviet deception, placed the main thrust further south than it came. The so-called New Year's Eve memorandum issued by Gehlen's branch on 31 December judged the Wehrmacht still superior in mobile warfare, and on 15 January Gehlen claimed that his branch had foreseen the Soviet intentions precisely, a claim the article finds untrue. There were other voices round Hitler as well: Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz promised to supply the armies cut off in Courland by sea, and the armaments minister Albert Speer insisted on holding the Hungarian oil region. 33 34

Guderian also recorded what followed the breakthrough. When Hitler, back in Berlin on 16 January, decided to shift forces from the West to the East, Guderian learned from Jodl that their core, the 6th SS Panzer Army, was going to Hungary, and protested sharply. Hitler retorted that without Hungarian oil tanks could not move or aircraft fly, and that "my generals understand nothing of war economics." After the evacuation of Warsaw, when the head of the Operations Department, Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin, and two lieutenant colonels were arrested, Guderian said the responsibility was his and that he, not his subordinates, should be arrested; Hitler replied that he meant to punish not Guderian but the General Staff. For weeks afterwards Guderian was questioned by Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the Reich Security Main Office, and Heinrich Müller of the Gestapo. The two lieutenant colonels were released but barred from the General Staff and sent to the front as regimental commanders, where von dem Knesebeck was soon killed. The demand to bring Army Group North out of Courland by sea came up at almost every briefing in these weeks. According to the memoir, on 16 January only the 4th Panzer Division was released; English Wikipedia writes that in mid-January Guderian obtained permission to withdraw seven divisions from Courland, while Hitler refused a total withdrawal. 32 35

Soviet UnionUnited KingdomGermanyWas the start brought forward from 20 to 12 January at Churchill's request?

When the Germans opened their Ardennes offensive on 16 December 1944, the American and British armies in the west were for a time in difficulty. On 6 January 1945 the British prime minister Winston Churchill wrote to Stalin that very heavy fighting was going on in the west and that General Eisenhower needed to know in outline what the Russians intended, asking whether "we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or elsewhere during January"; he added that he regarded the matter as urgent. In his reply the next day Stalin said the weather was not favourable for an offensive, but that in view of the Allies' position the Stavka had decided to complete its preparations at a forced pace and, "regardless of the weather, to open broad offensive operations against the Germans along the whole central front not later than the second half of January". 2 26

Soviet memoirs present the earlier start as the answer to this request. According to Konev, on 9 January Aleksei Antonov, then acting chief of the General Staff, called him on the high-frequency telephone line to say that the Allies, in difficulty in the Ardennes, had asked for the Soviet offensive to be brought forward if possible, that the Stavka had revised the start date, and that the 1st Ukrainian Front was to attack not on 20 but on 12 January. Konev answered without hesitation that the front would be ready, since preparations were largely complete, but writes that the eight-odd days taken away at a stroke had to be made up in two and a half days of intense work. He adds that the weather forecast for the middle of January was better than for the days just ahead, so that starting on the 12th meant accepting that the German defences would have to be suppressed by artillery alone, without aircraft. Shtemenko likewise wrote that "true to their obligations as allies, Soviet troops went over to a decisive offensive on 12 January, eight days earlier than planned", and Chuikov's memoir quotes Churchill's letter and Stalin's reply in the same context. The 1st Belorussian Front's attack was set for 14 January. In his memoir, published in 1970, Konev sharply criticised Western histories that failed to mention that the Soviet Union had advanced its offensive by eight days to help the Allies. 26 30 28

There is another explanation. English Wikipedia writes that the start was brought forward because meteorological reports warned of a thaw later in January, and the tanks needed hard frozen ground; in this view the claim that the offensive was meant to help the American and British forces in the Ardennes was something Stalin chose to assert at the Yalta Conference. The timing feeds the doubt: according to German Wikipedia, Hitler had already authorised the Commander-in-Chief West, Rundstedt, on 8 January to give up the western part of the Ardennes salient. By the time Churchill wrote, the crisis in the Ardennes was passing, and his letter was more an enquiry about Soviet plans for January than a demand for an earlier date. 1 3

The two explanations rest on different evidence, and the sources collected here cannot settle the question. Konev's account testifies that in the call of 9 January the Allied request was given as the reason; yet the same account says the forecast for mid-January was actually better, which fits poorly with the idea of hurrying to beat a thaw. English Wikipedia's thaw explanation, for its part, does not quote documents from inside the Soviet command. What is certain is that on 7 January Stalin promised Churchill an offensive, that it began five days later, and that the Soviet side afterwards repeatedly presented it as aid to the Allies. Russian Wikipedia likewise summarises Stalin's answer as saying that the operation planned for the end of January could be brought forward. 26 1 2

Soviet UnionGermanyHow did the breakout from the three bridgeheads unfold between 12 and 17 January?

At dawn on 12 January the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked first, from the Sandomierz bridgehead. According to Russian Wikipedia, after a fifteen-minute bombardment at 5 a.m. the forward battalions took the first German trench, and after targets were adjusted the full artillery preparation began at 10 o'clock. Konev writes that the short, violent opening barrage made the Germans think the general attack had begun and give away their fire positions, and that the artillery preparation which followed lasted one hour and forty-seven minutes, although captured German documents described it as having gone on for at least five hours. Bad weather ruled out air support. The bombardment all but destroyed the German XLVIII Panzer Corps, deployed across the face of the bridgehead; English Wikipedia quotes a battalion commander of the German 68th Infantry Division: "I began the operation with an understrength battalion... after the smoke of the Soviet preparation cleared... I had only a platoon of combat effective soldiers left." By the time the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies moved forward, the German 4th Panzer Army had lost up to two-thirds of its artillery and a quarter of its men. 26 4 1

According to Konev, on the first day the combined-arms armies advanced 15 to 20 kilometres, broke through the German main defensive belt and widened the breach by 40 to 60 kilometres on either side, and by midday both tank armies had entered the gap. The German XXIV Panzer Corps, committed to counter-attack, was surrounded by the Soviet tank armies around Kielce. When the advance slowed in front of Kielce, Konev turned Lelyushenko's 4th Tank Army, already on the move, south-west to envelop the town, which fell on 15 January. Walther Nehring's XXIV Panzer Corps then fought its way west for days in a "wandering pocket", suffering heavy losses, and screened by thick fog reached the Warta (German Warthe) on 22 January and went on across the Oder, some 350 kilometres from where it had started. The XLII Corps was largely destroyed, and its commander Hermann Recknagel was shot by Polish partisans on 23 January. 26 1 3

On 14 January the 1st Belorussian Front to the north attacked from the Magnuszew and Puławy bridgeheads. Zhukov, Chuikov and Russian Wikipedia all give the 14th; German Wikipedia dates the attack from Magnuszew to the 13th and from Puławy to the 14th. Here too the weather was bad: according to Chuikov not a single sortie was flown on the 14th, and Russian Wikipedia writes that in the first two days the 16th Air Army managed only 276 sorties, by its most experienced crews alone. From the Puławy bridgehead the 69th Army cut the line of retreat of the German LVI Panzer Corps, which disintegrated, and took Radom on 16 January. From Magnuszew the 8th Guards and 5th Shock Armies broke the front of the German 9th Army, and Mikhail Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army and Semyon Bogdanov's 2nd Guards Tank Army raced through the breach towards Łódź and Sochaczew. In his memoir Zhukov quotes the history of the German general Tippelskirch to the effect that by the evening of 16 January there was no longer a continuous German front between the Nida and the Pilica. When the weather cleared on 16 and 17 January, the air forces of the two fronts flew some 4,000 sorties, attacking the retreating German columns day and night. 25 28 2 3 1

The German command reacted late and piecemeal. According to Russian Wikipedia, Hitler left his western headquarters at Ziegenberg and returned to Berlin only on 15 January, the fourth day of the offensive. Against Guderian's advice he sent the Panzerkorps Großdeutschland from East Prussia towards Kielce, but Zhukov advanced so fast that the corps had to detrain at Łódź before reaching its objective, and ended up covering the 9th Army's retreat as it fell back towards the Warta. On 17 January the 1st Ukrainian Front's 52nd Army and 3rd Guards Tank Army took Częstochowa (German Tschenstochau); according to Russian Wikipedia a battalion of 21 tanks under Major Khokhryakov, carrying motorised infantry, burst into the town, which had a garrison of almost 10,000. Russian Wikipedia sums up that by 18 January the main forces of Army Group A had been routed and the German defences broken across a 500-kilometre front to a depth of 100 to 150 kilometres. 1 2 3

PolandSoviet UnionGermanyHow was ruined Warsaw liberated, and what part did the Polish 1st Army play?

Hitler had declared Warsaw a fortress on 27 July 1944, and the city was held by an improvised "Fortress Division Warsaw". By mid-January, however, little more than four security battalions and auxiliary units remained. As the danger of encirclement grew with Soviet forces wheeling round from north and south, the headquarters of Army Group A reported on 16 January that the garrison was too small to hold the city. According to Russian Wikipedia, Guderian left it to the army group to decide whether to go on defending Warsaw; according to English Wikipedia, Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin, head of the Operations Branch of the army high command, authorised the withdrawal against Hitler's order to hold fast. Meanwhile the 47th Army crossed the Vistula near Modlin on 15 January and closed in from the north, while the 61st Army and the Polish 1st Army enveloped the city from the south. 7 1 2

Polish soldiers were the first into the city. The Polish 1st Army had been raised on Soviet territory under Soviet sponsorship and was now commanded by Stanisław Popławski, a former Soviet army general. According to Polish Wikipedia, at 3 p.m. on 16 January the Polish 2nd Infantry Division crossed the Vistula near Jabłonna north of Warsaw and seized a bridgehead, and during the night of 16 to 17 January the 6th Infantry Division, which had been holding the Praga district on the eastern bank, crossed the river and drove the Germans out of the centre. Around 10 a.m. on the 17th the two divisions met near the Saxon Garden, and by 3 p.m. the city was free. With the German panzer units and the fortress division already gone, the Polish 1st Army's losses in taking Warsaw were 275 killed, missing and wounded, about 110 of them dead and some 60 of those killed by mines. Zhukov writes in his memoir that the Polish 1st Army entered Warsaw first, with the flank units of the 47th and 61st Armies behind it, and adds that the Soviet government instituted a medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw"; according to Polish Wikipedia it was awarded to 628,000 Soviet and Polish soldiers and civilians. 7 25

The liberators entered a field of ruins. By January 1945 between 85 and 90 per cent of Warsaw's buildings had been completely destroyed: by English Wikipedia's breakdown, up to 10 per cent in the fighting of 1939 and after, up to 15 per cent in the 1943 Ghetto Uprising, 25 per cent during the 1944 Uprising and 40 per cent in the systematic German demolition that followed it. The site of the former ghetto was a sea of rubble. According to Zhukov, the military council of the 1st Belorussian Front reported to Stalin after inspecting the city: "The fascist barbarians have destroyed the capital of Poland, Warsaw... Tens of thousands of inhabitants have been killed, the rest driven out. The city is dead." Zhukov wrote that the Polish soldiers took the destruction especially hard, and that he saw battle-hardened men weep and swear to punish the enemy. English Wikipedia likewise records that the troops of the 2nd Guards Tank and 3rd Shock Armies entering the city were profoundly affected by the devastation the Germans had left after the uprising. So wrecked was the city that the new government and its offices moved for a time to Łódź. 8 9 25 1

Hitler was furious that the "fortress" had been abandoned. He had Colonel von Bonin, who had authorised the withdrawal, arrested by the Gestapo; Bonin was held at Flossenbürg and Dachau and freed by the US Army in South Tyrol in May 1945. The commander of the 9th Army, Smilo von Lüttwitz, and of the XLVI Panzer Corps, Walter Fries, were dismissed. Zhukov remarks that, as after the defeat before Moscow, Hitler once again took it out on his generals: Harpe was replaced at the head of Army Group A by Ferdinand Schörner, and Lüttwitz by Theodor Busse. 1 25

Soviet UnionGermanyPolandWhy did Kraków and the Silesian industrial district change hands almost undamaged?

Kraków (German Krakau) was Poland's old royal capital and, under German occupation, the capital of the General Government ruled by Hans Frank from Wawel Castle. The Germans had prepared the Kraków area as a fortified region barring the way into Silesia. Konev saw the city as the key to Silesia and as Poland's ancient capital, and sent the 59th Army (Ivan Korovnikov), brought up from his second echelon, and the 60th Army (Pavel Kurochkin) to the south, with Poluboyarov's 4th Guards Tank Corps attached, against it. In his memoir he writes that "only our speed could save Kraków from destruction" and that the front command renounced artillery and air strikes on the city itself, shelling only its fortified approaches. On 19 January the 4th Guards Tank Corps swung round the city from the west and the garrison faced encirclement. Konev writes that he deliberately left open the last road south into the mountains: closing it would have meant rooting the Germans out of the city street by street and wrecking it. The Germans withdrew hurriedly and Kraków changed hands almost undamaged. English Wikipedia's article on Kraków says Soviet troops entered the city on 18 January; the article on the offensive and Russian Wikipedia say the city was taken on 19 January. 26 10 1 4

The larger problem was the Silesian industrial district. According to Konev it was Germany's second industrial region after the Ruhr, 70 kilometres wide and 110 long, a mass of towns grown into one another and packed with reinforced-concrete factories and massive brick houses; some 100,000 men of the German 17th Army were gathered there. On 20 January Konev turned Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army, which had been heading for Breslau, south along the Oder to encircle the district together with the 21st, 59th and 60th Armies pressing in from the north and east. But just before the ring closed, he writes, he changed his mind. Trapping the Germans would mean taking factory after factory, mine after mine and building after building, with heavy Soviet losses, and turning into ruins an industrial region that the new Poland was to have after the war. Konev admits that, as a professional soldier taught that encirclement is the crown of operational art, he found the decision hard and hesitated a long time. In the end he decided "not to encircle the enemy, to leave him a free corridor out of the Silesian basin and finish him off afterwards in the open field", and had to turn Rybalko's tank army, which had been racing to close the ring, once more. 26 30

The German record fits this outcome. According to English Wikipedia, the commander of the German 17th Army, Friedrich Schulz, asked on 25 and again on 26 January to withdraw his troops from the salient around Katowice (German Kattowitz) and was refused, until the army group commander Schörner finally allowed the withdrawal on the night of 27 January. English Wikipedia sums up that Konev had left just enough room for the 17th Army to pull out without serious resistance, and so secured the district undamaged. Konev looked back on this as one of the most memorable decisions of his war, though his account is a retrospective on a choice that turned out well. Much of the 17th Army escaped and fought on in Silesia and Czechoslovakia. To the north, meanwhile, Lelyushenko's 4th Tank Army seized a bridgehead across the Oder at Steinau (today Ścinawa), and Aleksei Zhadov's 5th Guards Army another at Ohlau (today Oława). 1 26

PolandGermanySoviet UnionHow was Auschwitz liberated, and where were its prisoners driven?

The camp complex at Oświęcim (German Auschwitz), west of Kraków, was the largest of the camps Nazi Germany used to murder the Jews of Europe. Between 1940 and 1945 about 1.3 million people were deported there and 1.1 million, most of them Jews, were murdered. In November 1944 Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer-SS, ordered the gassings stopped and the gas chambers and crematoria demolished. As Soviet forces approached in January 1945 he ordered all camps evacuated, telling commandants: "The Führer holds you personally responsible for... making sure that not a single prisoner from the concentration camps falls alive into the hands of the enemy." From 17 January some 58,000 prisoners, about two-thirds of them Jews, were marched west under guard: over 20,000 from Auschwitz I and II and over 30,000 from the subcamps. They went at first on foot, mostly to Wodzisław Śląski (German Loslau) and to Gleiwitz (today Gliwice), and from there in open freight wagons to camps in Germany and Austria. These marches over hundreds of kilometres in sub-zero cold and without food are called the death marches. The SS shot anyone unable to go on, and execution details following the columns killed those who fell behind; the historian Peter Longerich estimated that a quarter of the marchers were killed in this way. 12 13

The SS tried to destroy the evidence. On 20 January crematoria II and III were blown up; on the 23rd the "Kanada" warehouses holding plundered belongings were set on fire and burned for five days; and on the 26th, one day before the Red Army arrived, the last, crematorium V, was blown up. At about 9 a.m. on Saturday 27 January a soldier of the Red Army's 100th Rifle Division was the first to enter the Monowitz camp (Auschwitz III) beside the IG Farben works, and at about 3 p.m. other units of the 60th Army, the 322nd Rifle Division, reached the main camp Auschwitz I and Birkenau (Auschwitz II). According to German Wikipedia the 100th Rifle Division crossed the Vistula from the north, covering the flank of the 107th, 148th and 322nd Rifle Divisions advancing from the south. In the fighting around the camps, in the town of Oświęcim and in the village of Brzezinka, 231 Soviet soldiers were killed. English Wikipedia notes that liberating the camp was not a set objective of the Red Army but came about in the course of its westward advance. 13 12 3

In the three main camps 7,000 prisoners were still alive, and another 500 in the other subcamps: mostly people too ill to walk who had been left behind, many of them middle-aged adults and children under fifteen. The soldiers found more than 600 corpses, 837,000 women's garments, 370,000 men's suits, 44,000 pairs of shoes and 7 tonnes of human hair. The Soviet war crimes commission estimated that the hair came from 140,000 people, and the forensic institute in Kraków found traces of hydrogen cyanide, the active ingredient of Zyklon B, in it. Even soldiers used to death in battle were shaken. Vasily Petrenko, commander of the 107th Rifle Division, recalled: "I who saw people dying every day was shocked by the Nazis' indescribable hatred toward the inmates who had turned into living skeletons... It was in Auschwitz that I found out about the fate of the Jews." The liberators organised medical care and food together with the Polish Red Cross, and Red Army hospitals cared for 4,500 survivors. Yet the few Soviet newspaper reports on the liberation, in Pravda among others, failed to say that the victims were Jews. 13 12

Konev passed near the camp the day after its liberation but did not go in. In his memoir he wrote that he had already received the first reports of what the camp had been, but "consciously did not allow myself" to see the death camp with his own eyes: the fighting was at its height and he had no strength or time to spare for his own feelings, for in war he did not belong to himself. Three hundred survivors too weak to be moved were still in the camp in June 1945. 27 January is now observed by the United Nations and the European Union as International Holocaust Remembrance Day. 26 12

Soviet UnionGermanyPolandWhy did Łódź fall in a day while Poznań held out for a month?

Poland's second city, Łódź (Litzmannstadt under German occupation), fell almost without a fight. According to Chuikov, on 18 January his 8th Guards Army came within sight of the city but had lost contact with front headquarters. Having to choose between pressing on with a large garrison at his back and halting before the city to wait for orders, he decided to attack on his own authority, planning to go round to the north and west, into the rear, so as to spare the city. Then a baffling order arrived from front headquarters to reach by the 19th a line his troops had already taken the day before, and Chuikov carried on with the attack on his own responsibility. According to German Wikipedia, Łódź was liberated on 19 January by the 8th Guards Army's 29th Guards Rifle Corps together with the 9th Mechanised Corps coming up from the south. The Germans had confined more than 200,000 Jews in the city's Litzmannstadt Ghetto, the last major ghetto to be liquidated, in August 1944; only 877 Jews were still alive there in 1945. 28 3 11

Poznań (German Posen) was another matter. It was the capital of the Reichsgau Wartheland, the district Germany had annexed in 1939, and was ringed by a nineteenth-century Prussian fortress: eighteen massive forts set about two kilometres apart on a circle of some five kilometres' radius, with the Winiary citadel on a hill to the north. Hitler declared Poznań a fortress on 20 January. That same day the Gauleiter, Arthur Greiser, received a telegram relaying Hitler's order, ordered a general evacuation and left the city, only to be branded a deserter and coward once it emerged that Hitler had demanded Poznań be held to the last. Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army failed to take the city on the march on 22 to 24 January and moved on westward; according to Polish Wikipedia, Katukov argued that a tank army must keep going west rather than get stuck in street fighting, and Chuikov agreed. From 25 January four divisions of Chuikov's 8th Guards Army and two of Vladimir Kolpakchi's 69th Army stayed behind to reduce the fortress piece by piece. 14 17 3 15

Estimates of the garrison vary widely. Zhukov wrote that at first no more than 20,000 men were thought to be trapped but that in fact there were more than 60,000, and Chuikov likewise gives up to 60,000 including Volkssturm battalions; German Wikipedia gives 30,000 to 63,000 and English Wikipedia 15,000 to 20,000. The garrison was scraped together from officer-candidate schools, police, Luftwaffe ground staff, the Volkssturm, men returning from leave and stragglers from shattered divisions. On 28 January the German command replaced the fortress commander, Generalmajor Ernst Mattern, a police officer, with a committed Nazi, Ernst Gonell; according to English Wikipedia, Gonell imposed draconian discipline, and in some cases German soldiers trying to surrender were shot by their own side. 25 29 14 3

The fighting went on fort by fort and block by block. Chuikov describes in detail how his sappers drove garrisons out of the forts by dropping explosives and burning liquid into the ventilation shafts. By about 12 February the Germans held only the citadel, and on 15 to 16 February Gonell ordered the troops east of the Warta to break out, some 2,000 of them getting through. Attacking the citadel from 18 February, the Soviet troops had to cross a deep ditch and a steep rampart on ladders, and only in the early hours of the 22nd did they get tanks and self-propelled guns into the citadel over an assault bridge. Gonell killed himself, and Mattern, back in command, surrendered what was left. According to Chuikov, Mattern said: "I am not a member of the Nazi party. I would not have shed blood needlessly, knowing that resistance was hopeless. Hitler is finished," and told him that of the 60,000 men only about 12,000 fit to fight remained. According to Polish Wikipedia the last defenders of the citadel surrendered on the morning of 23 February, and Moscow fired a victory salute that day. 14 15 29

Estimates of the losses diverge as well. The Polish researcher Adam Pleskaczyński, working from documents of the Russian defence ministry's central archive, counted 5,512 Soviet soldiers certainly killed, missing or dead of wounds at Poznań and estimated the total at about 6,000; the Russian military historian Alexei Isaev gave 4,887. German losses are estimated at 2,000 to 3,000 killed and 7,000 to 9,000 wounded, and nearly all the surviving defenders were taken prisoner. Fifty-five per cent of the city was badly damaged. Some 2,000 local Poles were drafted as assault and sapper troops for the attack on the citadel, and about 100 of them were killed. Poznań was not alone: Hitler declared one city after another on the routes to the Oder a fortress. Breslau in Silesia had been made a fortress in August 1944; encircled in mid-February, it held out until 6 May. Küstrin on the Oder was declared a fortress on 26 January. Such fortresses blocked Soviet supply routes and tied down troops. 15 14 18 3

Soviet UnionGermanyWhy did the Soviet armies stop before Berlin once they reached the Oder?

In late January the 1st Belorussian Front swept past Poznań towards the German frontier. According to Zhukov, at midday on 25 January Stalin called to ask what he intended to do next. Zhukov replied that the enemy was demoralised and incapable of serious resistance, and that he meant to push on to the Oder and seize a bridgehead in the direction of Küstrin. Stalin objected that this would open a gap of more than 150 kilometres to the flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the north and could not be done now; Zhukov should wait about ten days until that front had finished its East Prussian operation and regrouped across the Vistula. The 1st Ukrainian Front to the south, he added, would be busy for some time with the Germans around Oppeln (today Opole) and Katowice and could not cover Zhukov's left. Zhukov asked not to be halted, since it would then be harder to break the fortified line at Meseritz (today Międzyrzecz), and requested just one more army to guard his right flank. Stalin gave no extra forces, but after further discussion allowed the advance. 25 30

According to Shtemenko, both front commanders wanted to go on to Berlin without a pause. Zhukov's plan, received by the General Staff on 26 January, was to bring up troops, artillery and supplies for four days and then attack again with the whole front on 1 to 2 February, crossing the Oder on the march and striking at Berlin. Konev's plan, arriving a day later, was to resume on 5 to 6 February, reach the Elbe by 25 to 28 February and take Berlin with his right wing together with Zhukov. The Stavka approved both, yet drew the boundary between the fronts as Zhukov had recommended on 26 January, a line that pushed the 1st Ukrainian Front south of Berlin and left it no opening against the capital. Shtemenko called it an "obvious absurdity": approving Konev's plan while making it impossible to carry out. It came from trying to square both fronts' plans with Stalin's wish that Berlin be taken by Zhukov, and the rivalry flared up again in the Battle of Berlin in April. 30

The Germans tried to rebuild the shattered front. On 24 January Army Group Vistula was formed under Reichsführer-SS Himmler, and on the 25th Hitler renamed his army groups, Army Group A becoming Army Group Centre. According to German Wikipedia, at a situation conference on 27 January Hitler voiced the hope that every step the Russians took towards Berlin would bring the Western Allies a step closer to a compromise. The Berlin Volkssturm was sent east, and more than half the panzer divisions were pulled out of the West. Meanwhile, after snowstorms on 26 to 29 January, Soviet troops pushed on to the Oder, helped by drifts that filled anti-tank ditches and frost that hardened marshes and rivers. On 31 January a unit of Nikolai Berzarin's 5th Shock Army crossed the frozen river and took the village of Kienitz, and on 2 February troops of the 8th Guards Army seized small bridgeheads south of Küstrin and Semyon Krivoshein's 1st Mechanised Corps north of it. According to Konev the Küstrin bridgehead then lay 60 kilometres from Berlin. But from early February the German defence west of the Oder revived; German Wikipedia writes that 3 February was the last day the Red Army crossed the Oder almost unhindered. According to English Wikipedia the Stavka declared the operation complete on 2 February; Russian Wikipedia ends it on 3 February. 3 1 25 26

The main reason for the halt was the northern flank. Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front was originally to cross the lower Vistula and advance west alongside Zhukov, but on 20 January the Stavka ordered four of its armies (the 3rd, 48th, 5th Guards Tank and 2nd Shock) to turn north and north-east into East Prussia. In a passage of his memoir restored in the 1997 edition, Rokossovsky wrote that this order changed at the root the task Stalin had first given him, and that with only two armies left heading west his left wing lagged behind, forcing Zhukov to stretch his forces to cover his own northern flank; he questioned how the Stavka had handled the operation. Zhukov's right wing had to screen the north with the 3rd Shock Army, the Polish 1st Army and the 47th and 61st Armies fanned out towards Pomerania, and on 15 February the Germans counter-attacked from Pomerania in Operation Solstice. Zhukov had already told his armies in early February to plan "to take Berlin by a swift dash on 15–16 February", but the Stavka decided to clear the Germans out of Pomerania before Berlin, and the attack on Berlin began only on 16 April. After the war Chuikov argued that Berlin could have been taken in February, and Zhukov retorted that it would have been a sheer gamble; that dispute and the Pomeranian campaign are covered in detail in the East Pomeranian Offensive of 1945. 27 25 1

GermanyPolandSoviet UnionWhat did German civilians and the people of the region go through?

Advancing so fast, the Soviet armies left the German civilians in their path little chance to flee. The Nazi government held back organised evacuation for fear of demoralising the troops. In the Reichsgau Wartheland the population was still being told to stay calm when Soviet units crossed into the district on 16 January, and on the 19th the local German-language papers still wrote that the land would remain German for ever. Only on the 20th, under pressure from the army, did the district leadership order an evacuation, and that same day Gauleiter Greiser left for Berlin with most of the party leadership. The so-called evacuation turned largely into a disorderly flight, and many civilians died between the bitter winter and the swiftly advancing Soviet forces. In Breslau, the Silesian capital, civilians were ordered to leave the city on 19 January under the direction of Gauleiter Karl Hanke; many thousands died in the bitter cold of the improvised evacuation, and many more ended up in Dresden. 16 17 18 20

Wherever refugee columns ran into Soviet units the toll was heavy. English Wikipedia sums up that in East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania civilians were crushed by tanks and shot, women and girls raped and left to die, and that Soviet aircraft bombed and strafed refugee columns; its article on the offensive likewise notes numerous reports of looting and attacks on Germans in areas the Wehrmacht had left. Estimates of civilians who died in the flight and evacuations across the whole east in 1944–1945 differ widely: 100,000 to 120,000 according to the German Federal Archive, 600,000 to 1.2 million according to the Polish historians Witold Sienkiewicz and Grzegorz Hryciuk. Views on the causes differ too. The historian Norman Naimark held that the propaganda of army newspapers, which cast the Red Army as an avenger come to punish all Germans, and the orders of the high command shared responsibility; other historians point to an order of 19 January 1945 requiring that mistreatment of civilians be prevented, and to front orders to shoot looters and rapists on the spot. Zhukov himself wrote in his memoir that after seeing the ruins of Warsaw the Soviet soldiers "were all embittered to the extreme and determined to punish the fascists hard for all their crimes". 20 1 19 25

The violence did not fall on Germans alone. In Przyszowice, an Upper Silesian village just short of the pre-1939 Polish–German border, Soviet troops between 26 and 28 January set dozens of houses on fire and shot the villagers who tried to put out the flames. Sources put the dead at between 54 and 69, aged from ten days to seventy-eight, among them four Auschwitz prisoners who had escaped from a death march the day before; it has been suggested that the soldiers believed they were already in Germany. The Polish Institute of National Remembrance declared the killings a crime against humanity and estimates that at least a thousand civilians were killed by Soviet troops in Silesia, about 800 of them in Gliwice. Under communist rule the events were censored, and a memorial stone was set up in the village cemetery only in 2005. On 26 January, meanwhile, the Silesian voivode appointed by the new Polish government, Aleksander Zawadzki, began expropriating the property of German Silesians. The expulsion of the German population went on for years, and the Potsdam Conference placed the lands east of the Oder–Neisse line under Polish administration. 21 19

PolandSoviet UnionFor Poland, was this liberation or the start of new domination?

For most Poles the offensive meant the end of a German occupation that had killed millions. But that end came with Soviet power. Leopold Okulicki, the last commander of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), the underground army loyal to the government-in-exile in London, ordered it dissolved on 19 January; the same day he secretly ordered his senior commanders not to reveal themselves and to keep small, well-hidden staffs. Since the autumn of 1944 the Soviet-backed Lublin regime had set a course of total confrontation with the Home Army, and in Kraków too Soviet troops began arresting Poles loyal to the government-in-exile and former Home Army members as soon as they arrived. On 27 and 28 March sixteen leaders of the underground state, invited to negotiations under a guarantee of safety, were arrested at Pruszków, taken to Moscow and tried (the Trial of the Sixteen). That story continues in the entry Poland: From the Lublin Committee to the United Workers' Party. 22 10 23

Soviet and new Polish government accounts present the operation as a liberation that restored the Polish state. Russian Wikipedia writes that Polish administration began to be re-established on the territories occupied by the Soviet army, and Shtemenko records that Soviet troops brought thousands of tonnes of flour and sugar to Warsaw's Praga district, Katowice, Kraków and elsewhere and restored more than 4,000 kilometres of railway. With Warsaw in ruins, Łódź served for a time as the seat of government, until Warsaw officially resumed its role as capital and was rebuilt. The Polish 1st Army, having liberated Warsaw in this offensive, went on to fight in Pomerania and at Berlin. According to Polish Wikipedia, the inscription "WARSAW 16–17 I 1945" was added after the war to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw. Both memories persist side by side: the day of release from German occupation, and the day from which a Soviet-backed regime began to suppress its opponents. 2 31 9 7

Soviet UnionGermanyPolandUnited KingdomUnited StatesWhat were the losses, and how did the offensive bear on the Yalta Conference?

By the official Soviet count (Soviet figures quoted by German Wikipedia), the Red Army lost 193,125 men in the operation, 43,251 of them killed or missing and 149,874 wounded, along with 1,267 tanks and self-propelled guns, 374 guns and 343 aircraft; Russian Wikipedia likewise gives irrecoverable losses of 43,300. The Polish 1st Army lost 10,537 men in the whole Warsaw operation, 3,116 of them killed. There is no reliable overall count of German losses. Soviet claims, as summarised by Russian Wikipedia, were that 35 German divisions were destroyed outright, 25 more lost 50 to 70 per cent of their strength and some 150,000 men were taken prisoner. Konev wrote that his front alone took 43,000 prisoners and killed more than 150,000, and on 23 February Stalin claimed that the forty days of the winter offensive along the whole front had cost the Germans 800,000 dead and 350,000 prisoners. These are Soviet claims not confirmed by independent sources. 3 2 7 26

The Yalta Conference (4–11 February 1945) met in the Crimea just as the offensive reached the Oder. English Wikipedia's article on the conference notes that Soviet forces then stood 65 kilometres from Berlin and had already pushed the Germans out of Poland. Shtemenko, citing Churchill's memoirs, records that at the session of 4 February Stalin gave an optimistic account of the situation: the German front had been broken and the Germans were merely patching holes. According to German Wikipedia, Stalin said at Yalta that he had gathered 180 divisions which at the points of main effort outnumbered the Germans sixfold in men and tanks, and English Wikipedia writes that Stalin claimed at Yalta that the offensive had been brought forward to help the Allies in the Ardennes. Poland was the first item on the agenda. The three leaders agreed that Poland's eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, with compensation in the west at Germany's expense, and that the pro-Soviet Provisional Government already in place would be "reorganized on a broader democratic basis" and hold free elections. The fact that Soviet troops held Poland strengthened Stalin's hand in these talks. The conference itself is covered in the entry on the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. 24 30 3 1

Militarily the Vistula–Oder offensive was a great Soviet success. In a matter of days the attacking forces advanced hundreds of kilometres, took most of Poland and struck deep within Germany's pre-war borders, breaking Army Group A and much of Germany's remaining capacity to resist. But English Wikipedia points out that stubborn German resistance in Silesia and Pomerania, together with the continuing fighting in East Prussia, delayed the final drive on Berlin by two months, by which time the Wehrmacht had once again built up a substantial force on that axis. German Wikipedia adds that while the Germans set up a new defence line on the Oder and the Neisse, the Western Allies began to push into Germany from early February. The Red Army opened the Battle of Berlin from the Oder bridgeheads on 16 April. 1 3

Consequences

Soviet forces took most of Poland and Silesia and seized bridgeheads on the Oder. German Army Group A was destroyed and hundreds of thousands of German civilians took flight. By the official Soviet count the Red Army lost some 193,000 men, 43,000 of them irrecoverably. The attack on Berlin began in April, after Pomerania had been cleared.

Timeline & Map

From the Vistula to the Oder Küstrin (Kostrzyn nad Odrą) Poznań Warsaw Magnuszew bridgehead Łódź Puławy bridgehead Breslau (Wrocław) Sandomierz bridgehead Katowice Kraków Oświęcim (Auschwitz) 1 Moscow 3 Moscow 4 Moscow 11 Moscow 14 Kienitz 15 Küstrin 17 Poznań citadel 10 Poznań 8 Warsaw 6 Magnuszew bridgehead 2 London 7 Kielce 5 Sandomierz bridgehead 13 Katowice 9 Kraków 12 Oświęcim 16 Livadia Palace, Yalta
  1. 11944.11.16Soviet Union
    Zhukov takes the 1st Belorussian Front

    Stalin put Zhukov in command of the 1st Belorussian Front and moved Rokossovsky to the 2nd Belorussian Front.

  2. 21945.01.06United KingdomSoviet Union
    Churchill's letter

    Churchill asked Stalin whether a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or elsewhere could be expected in January.

  3. 31945.01.07Soviet UnionUnited Kingdom
    Stalin's reply

    Stalin replied that regardless of the weather a broad offensive along the whole central front would open no later than the second half of January.

  4. 41945.01.09Soviet Union
    Start date moved

    Antonov told Konev the attack would start on 12 rather than 20 January. The same day Guderian pressed Hitler to reinforce the east.

  5. 51945.01.12Soviet UnionGermany
    1st Ukrainian Front attacks

    Konev's front opened its attack from the Sandomierz bridgehead and broke the German main defensive belt on the first day.

  6. 61945.01.14Soviet UnionGermany
    1st Belorussian Front attacks

    Zhukov's front attacked from the Magnuszew and Puławy bridgeheads.

  7. 71945.01.15Soviet UnionGermany
    Kielce taken

    The 1st Ukrainian Front took Kielce; the German XXIV Panzer Corps fought its way west in a wandering pocket.

  8. 81945.01.17Soviet UnionGermanyPoland
    Warsaw liberated

    The Polish 1st Army, with the 47th and 61st Armies, entered ruined Warsaw. Częstochowa was liberated the same day, and the death marches from Auschwitz began.

  9. 91945.01.19Soviet UnionGermanyPoland
    Kraków and Łódź liberated

    Kraków and Łódź were liberated. The same day Okulicki ordered the Home Army dissolved, and Breslau's civilians were ordered out.

  10. 101945.01.20Soviet UnionGermany
    Poznań declared a fortress

    Hitler declared Poznań a fortress and a belated evacuation was ordered in the Wartheland. Konev turned Rybalko's tank army towards Silesia, and the Stavka turned the 2nd Belorussian Front towards East Prussia.

  11. 111945.01.25Soviet UnionGermany
    Stalin–Zhukov call

    Stalin, worried about the northern flank, wanted a halt, but Zhukov won permission to push on to the Oder. Poznań was encircled.

  12. 121945.01.27Soviet UnionGermanyPoland
    Auschwitz liberated

    Units of the 60th Army entered Monowitz, the Auschwitz main camp and Birkenau, freeing some 7,000 remaining prisoners. That night the German 17th Army was allowed to withdraw from Silesia.

  13. 131945.01.28Soviet UnionGermanyPoland
    Silesian industrial district taken

    The 1st Ukrainian Front took Katowice and the Silesian industrial district almost undamaged.

  14. 141945.01.31Soviet UnionGermany
    The Oder crossed

    A unit of the 5th Shock Army crossed the frozen Oder and took Kienitz.

  15. 151945.02.03Soviet UnionGermany
    Operation ends

    Bridgeheads were held north and south of Küstrin, and the Soviet armies halted on the Oder line.

  16. 161945.02.04Soviet UnionUnited KingdomUnited States
    Yalta Conference opens

    Stalin reported on the Eastern Front at the opening session; Poland became the first item on the agenda.

  17. 171945.02.23Soviet UnionGermanyPoland
    Poznań citadel surrenders

    After a siege of nearly a month, the last defenders of the Poznań citadel surrendered.

Related people 24

Soviet Union and Poland (Red Army and Polish 1st Army)18

Participants14

Acting Chief of the General StaffAleksei Antonov1896–1962

On 9 January told Konev that the start had been brought forward from 20 to 12 January.

Stavka representative (Baltic fronts)Aleksandr Vasilevsky1895–1977

Was left coordinating only the two Baltic fronts when Stalin took over the four fronts on the Berlin axis himself.

Commander, 2nd Belorussian FrontKonstantin Rokossovsky1896–1968

Moved from the 1st Belorussian Front in November 1944. On 20 January was ordered to turn his main forces into East Prussia, which left Zhukov's northern flank exposed.

Chief of staff, 1st Belorussian FrontMikhail Malinin1899–1960

Briefed the army commanders on the front's offensive plan.

Chief of staff, 1st Ukrainian FrontVasily Sokolovsky1897–1968

Ran the planning of Konev's front.

Commander, 8th Guards ArmyVasily Chuikov1900–1982

Broke out from Magnuszew, attacked Łódź on his own decision and took it, and besieged the Poznań fortress for nearly a month. After the war argued that Berlin could have been taken in February.

Commander, 1st Guards Tank ArmyMikhail Katukov1900–1976

Drove through the Magnuszew breach past Łódź and Poznań to the Oder.

Commander, 2nd Guards Tank ArmySemyon Bogdanov1894–1960

Drove through the Magnuszew breach towards Sochaczew, cutting Warsaw off from the west.

Commander, 1st Mechanised CorpsSemyon Krivoshein1899–1978

In early February seized a bridgehead across the Oder north of Küstrin.

Commander, 3rd Guards Tank ArmyPavel Rybalko1894–1948

Drove through the Sandomierz breach past Częstochowa, then from 20 January wheeled south along the Oder to envelop the Silesian industrial district.

Commander, 4th Tank ArmyDmitry Lelyushenko1901–1987

Helped envelop and take Kielce, and seized a bridgehead across the Oder at Steinau.

Commander, 60th ArmyPavel Kurochkin1900–1989

Took part in the liberation of Kraków; units of his army entered the Auschwitz camps on 27 January.

Commander, 5th Guards ArmyAleksei Zhadov1901–1977

Seized a bridgehead across the Oder at Ohlau.

Commander, Polish 1st ArmyStanislav Poplavsky1902–1973

His army was the first into Warsaw on 17 January.

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32reference 33reference 34reference 35