Battle of Moscow
Why did Germany's Operation Typhoon stall within sight of Moscow, and how far did the Soviet winter counteroffensive go?
The Battle of Moscow was the first great battle of the Soviet-German war, fought west of Moscow from the start of Army Group Centre's Operation Typhoon on 30 September 1941 until the Red Army went over to the defensive on 20 April 1942. In October the Germans encircled hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops at Vyazma and Bryansk and broke the defences before Moscow, and the capital went through evacuation, panic and a state of siege. Amid mud, supply failure and stubborn Soviet resistance, the last German offensive in November stopped some 30 kilometres north of Moscow. On 5–6 December the Red Army counterattacked with reserves it had held back and drove the Germans back 100–250 kilometres, but the general offensive on every axis in January 1942 stalled before Rzhev and Vyazma at great cost.
Why Moscow, and why did the attack only begin at the end of September?
Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union that began on 22 June 1941, planned to take Moscow within four months. Of the three army groups, Army Group Centre had the Moscow axis, and with the capture of Smolensk on 16 July it passed the main gateway on the road to the capital. Moscow was the Soviet capital, the hub of its railways and communications and a major industrial region. Most German generals, including the army commander-in-chief Walther von Brauchitsch and the army chief of staff Franz Halder, therefore believed that a direct thrust on Moscow would draw out and destroy the main Soviet forces and end the war. 2 3
Adolf Hitler saw it differently. He believed the Soviet Union had to be defeated economically and wanted first the grain and minerals of Ukraine and the Crimean airfields that threatened the Romanian oilfields. His Directive No. 34 of 12 August said Moscow should be taken before winter but put the destruction of enemy forces and the seizure of economic regions first, and on 22 August the attack on Moscow was suspended for the time being. Part of Army Group Centre's armour, above all Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, turned south into the great encirclement east of Kiev. In that battle, which lasted until 26 September, the Red Army lost nearly 700,000 men killed, captured or wounded. 2 3
With victory in sight at Kiev, Hitler's Directive No. 35 of 6 September ordered Army Group Centre to finish preparing an attack on Moscow by the end of the month, and from 19 September the preparations went ahead under the name Operation Typhoon. But during nearly two months of fighting in the south the season had turned to autumn. By the German army staff's own count, at the start of September 30 per cent of the panzer divisions' tanks were total losses and 23 per cent were under repair, and motor vehicles were more than 22 per cent short. The trains to bring up fuel and ammunition fell short of what had been promised. Meanwhile the Soviet Union built new defence lines and reserve armies in front of Moscow. Some see these 'two months' as the cause of Germany's defeat; others argue that marching on Moscow while the Soviet armies at Kiev were still intact would have exposed the German southern flank. 3 2
How did Operation Typhoon break the Soviet front at Vyazma and Bryansk?
Operation Typhoon committed Army Group Centre (commander Fedor von Bock) with the 2nd, 4th and 9th Armies, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups and Albert Kesselring's Luftflotte 2: up to nearly two million men by some estimates, with between 1,000 and 2,470 tanks and assault guns depending on the source. Facing them were the Western Front (Ivan Konev), the Reserve Front (Semyon Budyonny) and the Bryansk Front (Andrei Yeryomenko), about 1.25 million men with roughly 1,000 tanks. Aleksandr Vasilevsky, then head of operations of the General Staff, wrote in his memoir that the Stavka had no strategic reserves ready to hand and so could not take more decisive steps. 2 1 15
On 30 September Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group set off first from the Glukhov area in the south, and on 2 October the main body of Army Group Centre attacked. Oryol fell on 3 October and Bryansk was taken from the rear on the 6th. Driving in from north and south, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups met at Vyazma on 7 October and encircled 37 divisions of the Western and Reserve Fronts, including the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies, while further pockets formed north and south of Bryansk. The encircled troops fought on until about the 13th and tied down 28 German divisions; Vasilevsky judged that this time was decisive for building the Mozhaisk line. 1 4 15
Vasilevsky did not put the Vyazma defeat down only to enemy superiority and the lack of reserves. In his memoir he blamed 'the incorrect determination of the direction of the enemy's main blow by the Stavka and the General Staff', and with it a faulty deployment: two armies of the Reserve Front sat in the first line between the Western and Bryansk Fronts, while its other three were strung out in a single line just behind the Western Front, which made command and coordination very hard. Since Vasilevsky himself headed the General Staff's operations directorate, the verdict is also self-criticism. 15
Konstantin Rokossovsky, commander of the 16th Army, saw the confusion at close quarters. According to his memoir A Soldier's Duty, on the evening of 5 October he received a telegram from the Western Front ordering him to hand over his sector and troops to the 20th Army commander Filipp Yershakov and go with only his staff to Vyazma on the 6th, there to take five rifle divisions and organise a counterstroke toward Yukhnov. His chief of staff Mikhail Malinin exclaimed, 'Leave the troops at a time like this? Unthinkable!', and Rokossovsky set off only after receiving the order again over the signatures of Konev and Nikolai Bulganin, member of the Military Council. On the afternoon of the 6th there were no divisions in Vyazma at all. While he was talking with Smolensk party officials gathered in the cellar of the town's cathedral, German tanks entered the town; the 16th Army staff gathered a militia division and stragglers, slipped out between the rings of encirclement and crossed the Gzhat on the night of the 9th. 10
In the south, Dmitry Lelyushenko's 1st Guards Special Rifle Corps, hastily formed from the Stavka reserve, barred Guderian's way at Mtsensk. On 6 October Mikhail Katukov's tank brigade struck a battlegroup of the German 4th Panzer Division from the flank with T-34s hidden in the woods, and Guderian recorded his shock at the T-34 in his memoirs; research by Niklas Zetterling, however, plays the action down, noting that only part of the division fought and the Germans lost just nine tanks. The scale of the losses is more disputed still. Germany announced 673,000 prisoners from the two pockets; recent research puts the figure at about 514,000. A Russian study counts only about 85,000 men who got out. On 9 October the German propaganda ministry assured a press conference that the armies defending Moscow were about to be destroyed. 2 15 1
How did Moscow survive the October crisis?
Recalled from Leningrad, Georgy Zhukov became commander on 10 October of a Western Front that now combined what remained of the Western and Reserve Fronts, with Konev as his deputy. At about the same time Kliment Voroshilov and Vyacheslav Molotov, at the front as representatives of the State Defence Committee, asked Rokossovsky, just out of the encirclement, how he came to be near Vyazma with his staff but without the 16th Army's troops. When Rokossovsky produced the order, he recalled, a stormy exchange followed between Voroshilov and Konev and Bulganin. In the north Kalinin fell on 14 October, and three days later the three armies on that axis were formed into a new Kalinin Front under Konev. 2 10 15
The last line west of Moscow was the Mozhaisk line, built in haste since July from the Volga reservoir (the 'Moscow Sea') through Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets, yet in mid-October only about 90,000 men held it. Zhukov concentrated them on four axes: Rokossovsky's 16th Army at Volokolamsk, the 5th Army (under Leonid Govorov after Lelyushenko was wounded) at Mozhaisk, the 43rd at Maloyaroslavets and the 49th at Kaluga. Fourteen rifle divisions, sixteen tank brigades and more than forty artillery regiments were rushed in from other fronts and the interior, and three rifle and two tank divisions came from the Far East. Even so the Germans took Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets on 18 October, Naro-Fominsk on the 21st and Volokolamsk on the 27th. 2 15 1
When the Mozhaisk line was breached the capital wavered. On 15 October the State Defence Committee's decree No. 801 moved government bodies, the General Staff and foreign embassies to Kuibyshev and other cities, and factories, power stations and bridges were prepared for demolition. From the 16th, for three days, rumours spread that the city was to be surrendered. Tens of thousands crowded the stations and eastbound roads; closing factories paid their workers a month's wages and food shops handed out their stock before shutting. There was looting and trains were attacked. On the morning of the 16th, on Lazar Kaganovich's instruction, the metro did not open while its destruction was prepared, the only time this has happened in its history; repair began that afternoon and the first train ran again in the evening. 5 1
Stalin did not leave Moscow. Vasilevsky recalled that after the main body of the General Staff evacuated on 16 October he stayed with the Stavka at the head of an operations group of about ten officers. On the 17th Alexander Shcherbakov, first secretary of the Moscow party, went on the radio to deny the rumours of surrender. By its decision of the 19th the State Defence Committee placed Moscow and its suburbs under a state of siege from the 20th, allowing panic-mongers and looters to be shot on the spot, and the Moscow Military District filled three defence rings, along the outer circle railway, the Garden Ring and the city centre, with barricades and anti-tank obstacles. The panic subsided on the fourth day. These days long remained taboo in Soviet historiography, and the full text of the evacuation decree of 15 October was not published until the late 1980s. 15 5 1
Muscovites turned out to dig. By Zhukov's account 250,000 women and teenagers dug trenches and anti-tank ditches by hand, moving almost three million cubic metres of earth, while a car factory made submachine guns and a clock factory mine fuses. Rokossovsky, passing briefly through Moscow in early November, wrote that he was moved to the depths of his soul by women of every age silently digging in the cold rain. 2 11
What happened at Volokolamsk, and how much of 'Panfilov's Twenty-Eight' is true?
Arriving at Volokolamsk on 14 October, Rokossovsky's 16th Army took a sector of almost 100 kilometres from the Volga reservoir to the Ruza river. In the north stood Lev Dovator's cavalry group, which had broken out of encirclement (including Issa Pliyev's 50th Cavalry Division); in the middle a regiment of cadets from the military school named after the Supreme Soviet of the Russian republic; and on the southern, left wing Ivan Panfilov's 316th Rifle Division. The division had been raised mainly from the Kazakh and Kirghiz republics, and Rokossovsky wrote that he had not seen so well manned and equipped a division for a long time. Pointing to a defence line where the builders had got no further than marker stakes, Panfilov is said to have remarked, 'Well, here we have sat down on the stakes.' Expecting the main German blow on this left wing, the army built a deep anti-tank defence there, and the 1075th Regiment laid 4,000 mines along a four-kilometre anti-tank ditch. 11 8
The fighting for Volokolamsk began on 16 October when German armour struck the 316th Division. On the 17th and 18th, 100 to 150 tanks came on at a time, and the 16th Army held them by shifting its artillery from one threatened point to another. On the 25th the Germans took Volokolamsk station; Rokossovsky, his artillery exhausted, asked Zhukov for help, endured a dressing-down and obtained two regiments of 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, which he gave to Panfilov. Volokolamsk fell on 27 October, but a German attempt to cut the road east to Istra was stopped by Pliyev's cavalry division. On the strength of the fighting of 20–27 October Zhukov recommended the 316th for the Guards title and the Order of the Red Banner. 11 8
During the lull in early November the 16th Army retook Skirmanovo from the German 10th Panzer Division on 11–14 November, removing the threat to the Volokolamsk–Istra road; Pliyev's cavalry, the 18th Rifle Division, which had begun as a militia division, and Katukov's tank brigade from Mtsensk fought together. Four cavalry divisions arrived from Central Asia, their horses not even shod for winter, and from Siberia came Afanasy Beloborodov's 78th Rifle Division at full strength. Just before the German offensive the Western Front ordered a pre-emptive counterstroke north of Volokolamsk with one night to prepare. Rokossovsky recalled that his request for more time was refused and that the attack, launched on 16 November, ran into the German general offensive and ended with Dovator's cavalry nearly surrounded. 11 2
On 16 November battlegroups of the German 2nd Panzer Division attacked the 1075th Rifle Regiment's positions near the Dubosekovo halt. What the operational records confirm is this: the 4th Company of the regiment's 2nd Battalion fought German tanks and lost its position, and in 1948 the regimental commander Ilya Kaprov testified that 'on that day the 4th Company fought German tanks at Dubosekovo and truly fought heroically; more than 100 men of the company were killed, not 28.' In the fighting of 16–18 November the 316th's three rifle regiments were reduced to 120–200 men each, but on the 18th the German 2nd Panzer Division was still 25 kilometres short of its objective for the day. Panfilov was killed by mortar fragments outside his observation post on 18 November; Rokossovsky wrote that the news came just after a broadcast announcing that the division had received the Red Banner and become the 8th Guards Rifle Division. 8 7 12
The story of 'the Twenty-Eight' came from the press. On 27 November the army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda reported that soldiers of one company had held out to the last against 54 tanks, and the next day's editorial was headed 'The Testament of the 28 Fallen Heroes'. An article of 22 January 1942 fixed the place and date as Dubosekovo on 16 November and printed 28 names, 18 tanks destroyed and the words of the political officer Vasily Klochkov: 'Russia is vast, but there is nowhere to retreat; Moscow is behind us.' All 28 were made Heroes of the Soviet Union in July 1942. In 1947, however, Ivan Dobrobabin, listed among the dead, was arrested for having served as an auxiliary policeman under the German occupation, and the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office investigated. Its report of May 1948 concluded that the battle as the newspaper described it did not take place, that the number 28 and Klochkov's words had been made up by the reporters and editors, and that six of the men on the list were alive. 8 7
The report was buried, and in 1966 a writer who questioned the story was publicly rebuked by Leonid Brezhnev. The documents became known after perestroika, and in 2015 the director of the Russian State Archive, Sergei Mironenko, published the report and was soon removed from his post. Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky retorted that even if the story were invented from start to finish it was a 'sacred legend' not to be touched. Marshal Dmitry Yazov and the historian Georgy Kumanyov, among others, argue that a fight at Dubosekovo did take place and that the 1948 investigation overreached, citing the article's author's later recollection that he had confessed to inventing it under threat of exile. In sum, it is documented that the 1075th Regiment and the 316th Division slowed the Germans at great cost on 16–18 November, while the number 28, the deaths of all of them, the 18 tanks and Klochkov's last words were judged to be the newspaper's creation. The 1988 edition of Rokossovsky's memoir and Vasilevsky's memoir both give the Twenty-Eight in the official version. 7 8 12 15
Why did the last German offensive in November stop at the gates of Moscow?
When the rains came in late October the roads turned to mud. On 19 October Army Group Centre's war diary recorded a grave crisis in the supply of food, ammunition and above all fuel, and supplies reaching the attacking divisions fell from 900 tonnes a day to around 20. On 31 October the German army command halted the offensive until supply recovered and the roads hardened. In early November the ground began to freeze. On 6 November Stalin spoke at a commemorative meeting held in Mayakovskaya metro station, and on the morning of the 7th the parade for the 24th anniversary of the Revolution was held on Red Square at 8 a.m., two hours earlier than usual. Budyonny took the salute, Stalin spoke and the units marched straight on to the front. Prepared in secret from 24 October, the parade was broadcast at home and abroad as a sign that the capital would hold. 1 3 6 2
The Germans attacked again with 51 divisions, 13 of them armoured and 7 motorised. In the north the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups were to pass Klin and Solnechnogorsk and envelop Moscow from the north; in the south Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army was to bypass Tula, climb to Kashira and Kolomna and meet them at Noginsk, east of the capital, while the 4th Army in the centre pinned down the Western Front. The offensive began on 15–16 November in the north and on the 18th in the south. The Soviet side now had a far deeper, layered defence with second echelons than in October, but its reserves were thin. Stalin had several pre-emptive counterattacks made over Zhukov's objections; most are judged to have wasted troops for little gain. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that, on a date he could not recall but soon after the German breakthrough on the 30th Army's sector, Stalin telephoned and asked whether he was sure Moscow would be held: 'I ask you this with pain in my heart. Speak honestly, as a communist.' Zhukov replied: 'We shall certainly hold Moscow. But we need at least two more armies and at least two hundred tanks.' Stalin said there were no tanks yet but that two reserve armies would be ready by the end of November. They were the 1st Shock and 10th Armies, which later led the counteroffensive. 1 2 16
In the north a gap opened between the 16th Army and the neighbouring 30th. Klin fell on 23 November, Solnechnogorsk on the 23rd–24th and Istra on the 26th. On the 27th the German 7th Panzer Division crossed the Moscow–Volga Canal by an unblown bridge at Yakhroma, only to be thrown back the next day by the 1st Shock Army, and around the 30th the Germans reached Krasnaya Polyana, a little over 30 kilometres from the Kremlin. On 2 December a German reconnaissance unit got as far as the canal bridge at Khimki, the closest approach of all. Kryukovo changed hands several times. On 24 November Soviet troops blew the sluices of the Istra reservoir and others, flooding the ground the Germans meant to cross. 1 2 3
This retreat brought Rokossovsky and Zhukov into collision. According to Rokossovsky, when after three days' fighting the battle had been pushed back to within 10–12 kilometres west of the Istra reservoir, he asked to withdraw in advance behind the reservoir and the Istra river, a good natural barrier that could be held with few troops, freeing others for the threatened Klin axis. When Zhukov refused, he telegraphed the Chief of the General Staff, Boris Shaposhnikov, received within hours a reply that the proposal was correct and sanctioned, and issued the withdrawal order. Then came a telegram from Zhukov: 'I command the troops of the front! I cancel the order to withdraw beyond the Istra reservoir and order you to defend the present line and not take a step back.' Rokossovsky obeyed, and wrote that the Germans pressed on, crossed the Istra and seized bridgeheads. 12
The episode is known mainly from Rokossovsky's account. The 1988 text gives only the sequence of events and the telegram; his sharper verdict was cut by the censors from the first edition. In passages restored in the 1997 edition (some printed earlier in the Military History Journal in 1989), Rokossovsky wrote that Zhukov was wrong and that his personal 'I' often prevailed over the common interest. Zhukov's memoirs do not mention the withdrawal request or the countermanding telegram. He wrote only that in the fighting of 16–18 November the 16th Army fell back 'slowly but in complete order' to lines prepared in advance and already occupied by artillery, and that when it left Solnechnogorsk on the 25th, after Klin, the situation became 'catastrophic' and the front scraped together tanks, anti-tank riflemen and anti-aircraft battalions from other sectors and sent them there. He did leave another scene involving the 16th Army. On a false report that Dedovsk had fallen, Stalin ordered Zhukov to go in person and retake it; it turned out that the Germans held only a few houses of the village of Dedovo across a ravine. Zhukov went with Rokossovsky and Leonid Govorov, commander of the 5th Army, to Afanasy Beloborodov's 9th Guards Rifle Division and, although the division commander explained convincingly that there was no tactical reason to retake the houses, had him send a rifle company with two tanks to clear them, writing that this time he had to be guided 'by anything but tactical considerations'. Zhukov's position should be weighed too. In the same chapter Rokossovsky himself acknowledged that Zhukov did everything he could to shore up the weakened troops while refusing to feed the arriving strategic reserves into battle piecemeal, which took great restraint. The Western Front had no reserves left, and Zhukov was himself pleading with Stalin for them. Vasilevsky likewise counted the Stavka's 'restraint and will' in keeping the strategic reserves near Moscow for the counteroffensive, even at critical moments, among the battle's lessons. Rokossovsky also recalled that around this time Stalin telephoned him in person, asked him 'to hold out a little longer, we will help you', and that by morning a Katyusha regiment, anti-tank regiments and tank battalions had arrived. 12 15 2 16
In the south Tula held to the end. From 29 October the remnants of the 50th Army, an NKVD regiment and the Tula workers' regiment defended the city with its inhabitants; Guderian took Stalinogorsk on 22 November and reached the approaches to Kashira on the 25th–26th, but was thrown back by the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the 112th Tank Division. On 1 December the 4th Army in the centre made a last attempt to break through along the Minsk highway at Naro-Fominsk, but was stopped by the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Division and the 33rd Army and fell back four days later. A French volunteer regiment in German service took part in this attack. 1 2
Why the offensive stopped has long been argued over. After the war German generals stressed the mud, the cold and Hitler's mistakes. Bock reported −45 °C on 30 November, and the 6th Panzer Division commander's diary recorded −36 to −38 °C on 4–7 December; yet Soviet weather service records give a December minimum of −28.8 °C, and Zhukov wrote that November temperatures stayed around −7 to −10 °C. Frostbite cases exceeded 130,000, but many point out that the Germans fought without winter clothing less because of the weather than because their plans and supply assumed a short war. The weather was the same for the Red Army. Rokossovsky argued that deep snow and frost actually hampered the Soviet pursuit: 'the German generals should rather thank the harsh winter, which helped them withdraw from Moscow with smaller losses, than claim that the Russian winter was the cause of their defeat.' Above all, the German troops were exhausted; some regiments had only 150–200 fighting men left, and Guderian wrote: 'The offensive on Moscow has failed.' 2 3 13 1
How was the December counteroffensive prepared, and how far did it go?
The key to the counteroffensive was the reserves that had been held back. According to Vasilevsky, the idea of a counteroffensive arose in early November, was shelved when the Germans renewed their attack, and came back at the end of November when the enemy had spent his offensive power and was strung out over a wide front. The Stavka gathered the 1st Shock Army on the canal line at Dmitrov and Yakhroma, Andrey Vlasov's 20th Army north of Moscow and Filipp Golikov's 10th Army around Ryazan, with the 26th and 61st Armies coming up. According to Zhukov, the idea of a counteroffensive had arisen in November and took final shape during the defensive battles, and on 29 November he telephoned Stalin and asked him to order it. When Stalin asked whether he was sure the enemy had reached a crisis and could not bring up some large new grouping, Zhukov answered: 'The enemy is exhausted. But if we do not eliminate the dangerous enemy wedges now, the Germans will be able to reinforce their troops near Moscow with large reserves from their northern and southern groupings.' Late that evening the Stavka decided on the counteroffensive and asked for the front's plan. The next day, 30 November, Zhukov sent the Western Front's plan, drawn on a map, to the General Staff, asking Vasilevsky to 'report it urgently to Comrade Stalin and issue a directive, or we may be too late with the preparations' (the note appears in both men's memoirs), and it was approved at once; Vasilevsky added that the front's chief of staff Vasily Sokolovsky had contributed much to it. The plan's core was to smash first the two German pincers that had tried to envelop Moscow from north and south. 15 3 16
By Soviet figures the counteroffensive committed 1.1 million men, 7,652 guns and mortars, 774 tanks (222 of them heavy and medium) and 1,000 aircraft, against Army Group Centre's 1,708,000 men, 13,500 guns, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft (695 according to Vasilevsky). Overall the Red Army was not superior; it created superiority only by massing at key points. As late as 4 December the German army staff's Foreign Armies East section judged that the Soviets could not mount a major offensive without substantial reinforcements, and air reconnaissance reports of troops detraining near Moscow were dismissed as 'phantoms'. Counting divisions instead, as in figures cited by the German Wikipedia, gives the Kalinin and Western Fronts 106 against 68, so comparisons depend on what is counted. 1 15 3
It is often said that the 'Siberian divisions' saved Moscow. The popular version is that when Richard Sorge, the Soviet agent in Tokyo, reported that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union, Stalin moved large forces from the Far East to the west. Divisions did come from the Far East and Siberia in autumn 1941: Vasilevsky writes that three rifle and two tank divisions arrived from the Far East by mid-October, and Afanasy Beloborodov's 78th Division was a Siberian formation. But the 1st Shock and 20th Armies that led the counteroffensive were formed from units from Central Asia, the Far East, the Urals and the Volga as well as Siberia, and by figures cited in the German Wikipedia 25 reserve divisions remained in Siberia both on 1 October and on 1 December. How decisive Sorge's intelligence was, and how large the Siberian share, are judged differently by different scholars, and some caution that the outcome cannot be explained by the information of his Japanese source Hotsumi Ozaki alone. 2 3 15 1
The counteroffensive opened on 5 December with Konev's Kalinin Front, and on the 6th the Western Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front under Semyon Timoshenko followed. The 16th Army went over to the attack without a pause, retook Kryukovo on 8 December and captured two 300 mm guns brought up to shell Moscow. When the Germans blew the Istra reservoir dam and icy water poured out, mobile groups under Katukov and Remizov went round the reservoir to north and south, and Rokossovsky recalled Beloborodov's Siberians crossing the torrent on logs, fences and straw rafts. Solnechnogorsk was retaken on the 12th, Klin on the 15th and Kalinin on the 16th, and in the south the threat to Tula was lifted on the 16th. Lev Dovator was killed during the December counteroffensive. 2 1 13 3
Vasilevsky also recorded the counteroffensive's weaknesses: in the first ten days the Western Front's right wing advanced more slowly than planned; tanks, aircraft and ammunition were lacking on the decisive axes; artillery preparation was short and weak; and tanks were tied to infantry support. On 12 December Stalin rebuked the Kalinin Front by direct line: 'Instead of falling on the enemy with all your forces and creating a decisive superiority, you... commit separate units, letting the enemy wear them down.' Still, things were worse on the German side. On 8 December Hitler's Directive No. 39 put the whole Eastern Front on the defensive, and after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th, Germany declared war on the United States on the 11th. 15 3 2
The German command was in crisis. On the 14th Halder and Günther von Kluge authorised a limited withdrawal west of the Oka without Hitler's approval, but on the 16th Hitler forbade large-scale withdrawals and on the 18th ordered commanders to drive their troops to 'fanatical' resistance in their positions. On the 19th he dismissed Brauchitsch and took command of the army himself, and Kluge replaced Bock at Army Group Centre. Guderian, who pulled his troops back without orders, was dismissed on 25–26 December, and Erich Hoepner, commanding the 4th Panzer Army, was dismissed in disgrace on 8 January 1942. Opinions of the hold-fast order differ. Günther Blumentritt, chief of staff of the 4th Army, wrote that it was right because a retreat through snow and ice would have led to a collapse like that of Napoleon's Grande Armée; Gotthard Heinrici wrote to his wife that the high command, which had pressed the attack without winter clothing or supplies, was now demanding sacrifices. 2 1 3
How Guderian came to be dismissed is told differently in his memoirs and in research. Guderian wrote that on 20 December he flew to Hitler's headquarters at Rastenburg in East Prussia and talked with him for five hours. When he reported that he was falling back to the line of the Zusha and Oka, Hitler burst out, "No, I forbid that!" and told him to dig in and defend every square metre, to which Guderian replied that the ground was frozen to a depth of 1 to 1.5 metres and could not be dug. On 25 December, he wrote, he quarrelled sharply with Kluge, now commanding Army Group Centre, over part of the 10th Motorized Division being surrounded at Chern; when Kluge hung up saying "I shall report you to the Führer", Guderian asked to be relieved, but Kluge had already requested his replacement, and on the morning of the 26th Hitler's order transferring him to the army high command's reserve arrived, with Rudolf Schmidt of the 2nd Army as his successor. Guderian claims in his memoirs that he passed Hitler's hold-fast order to his troops himself, whereas English Wikipedia sums up that he refused to pass it on and so fell out with Kluge. According to German Wikipedia, at the start of the crisis Guderian had actually hoped Hitler would intervene "with his customary energy", and the historian David Stahel sees him as slavishly devoted to Hitler and fundamentally misreading the situation. 17 18 19
Why did the general offensive of January 1942 stall before Rzhev and Vyazma?
By early January the Red Army had reached a line through Selizharovo, Rzhev, Volokolamsk, Ruza, Mosalsk, Belev and Mtsensk, having thrown the Germans back 100 and in places 250 kilometres from Moscow. At a Kremlin meeting on 5 January Stalin announced simultaneous offensives on every axis from Leningrad to the Crimea, and the plan was adopted over Zhukov's objections. As Vasilevsky summarised it, the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts were to lift the siege of Leningrad, the Kalinin and Western Fronts to encircle and destroy the main forces of Army Group Centre, the Southern and Southwestern Fronts to recover the Donbas and the Caucasus Front to retake the Crimea. On 10 January the Stavka, on Stalin's initiative, issued a directive letter calling for shock groups and a switch to the 'artillery offensive'. 15 2
Zhukov described the meeting himself. On the evening of 5 January, after Shaposhnikov had set out the draft plan and Stalin invited comments, Zhukov argued that on the western axis, where the enemy had not yet recovered, the offensive should go on but the troops needed men, equipment and above all tank units; at Leningrad and on the south-western axis, he said, the troops faced a strong defence and without powerful artillery would fail to break it, wear themselves out and suffer 'heavy and unjustified losses', so the western fronts should be reinforced instead. Nikolai Voznesensky, chairman of the State Planning Committee, backed him, saying the material means for a simultaneous offensive on all fronts did not yet exist. Stalin replied that Timoshenko was in favour of attacking in the south-west too and asked who else wished to speak; no one answered, and there the discussion ended. Leaving the office, Shaposhnikov told Zhukov: 'You argued in vain: the Supreme Commander had decided this question beforehand.' When Zhukov asked why their opinion had been sought, he sighed: 'I don't know, I don't know, my dear fellow.' 16
Under the Stavka directive of 7 January the Kalinin Front was to strike from northwest of Rzhev toward Sychevka and Vyazma, and the left wing of the Western Front from the Kaluga area toward Yukhnov and Vyazma, to encircle Army Group Centre around Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov and Gzhatsk. The Kalinin Front attacked on 8 January and the Western Front on the 10th. But on 19 January Stalin, contrary to Zhukov's plan, pulled the 1st Shock Army out and sent it north to Demyansk. Zhukov wrote that he telephoned Stalin to keep the army, and was told: 'Withdraw it without any argument. You have plenty of troops; count how many armies you have.' When he objected again, Stalin hung up without answering. Mikhail Grigoryevich Yefremov's 33rd Army, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the parachuted 4th Airborne Corps pushed through to the Vyazma area but were themselves encircled, and in mid-April Yefremov took his own life in the pocket. On 20 April both fronts went over to the defensive. Soviet losses in this operation are put at 776,889, of them 272,320 irrecoverable. The Rzhev–Vyazma salient that remained became a costly battleground until March 1943. 16 9 1
On 21 January Rokossovsky's 16th Army command was ordered south to Sukhinichi to take over units of Golikov's 10th Army, which had been driven back by a German counterattack. The 16th Army planned to attack on the morning of the 29th, but the Germans pulled out first; Rokossovsky wrote that when he reported that evening that Sukhinichi was free, Zhukov called back to make sure the report was true. In passages cut by the censors from the first edition and restored in the 1997 edition, Rokossovsky was far sharper. He wrote that the continued offensives under orders to 'wear the enemy down' wore down the Red Army more than the enemy, calling this 'the gravest mistake of the Stavka and the General Staff' and 'a kind of paradox: the stronger side defended and the weaker attacked'. The 1988 text says only that the counteroffensive ended in early January and that the enemy recovered and his defence grew firmer. 13 14
Vasilevsky explains the same outcome differently. He wrote that the guidance in the directive of 10 January mattered, but that tasks of that size needed far more weapons, ammunition and equipment, and since the Stavka needed time to create and build up such reserves, the troops had to go over to the defensive without completing the operations they had begun; at the start of the general offensive the Red Army had roughly a 1.5-to-1 edge in tanks and aircraft but was only equal in infantry and artillery. Zhukov, too, later judged that the situation around Vyazma had been misread: 'We overestimated the capabilities of our troops and underestimated the enemy.' He gave the shortages as an example: in the first ten days of January the Western Front received 1 per cent of the planned 82 mm mortar bombs and 20 to 30 per cent of its artillery rounds, and every time the commanders were called to the Stavka they 'literally begged' for anti-tank rifles, submachine guns and ten or fifteen anti-tank guns. The American historian David Glantz attributes the costly failure of the whole series of winter offensives to the Stavka underestimating the Wehrmacht, overestimating the Red Army and scattering its forces over too many axes. The hope that the counteroffensive's success would lead straight to victory in the war pushed an army that did not yet have the strength too far. 15 16 9
What did the battle cost, and what did it change?
Losses vary widely with how the battle is bounded. By official Russian figures the Red Army's irrecoverable losses (killed, missing and captured) from 30 September to 20 April came to 936,644 and its sanitary losses (wounded and sick) to 898,689: 514,338 irrecoverable in the defensive phase to 5 December alone, 139,586 in the counteroffensive to early January and 272,320 in the Rzhev–Vyazma operation. Scholars such as John Erickson and David Glantz, who end the battle on 7 January, give smaller totals. German losses are more uncertain still. Army Group Centre's official ten-day reports give 35,757 killed, 128,716 wounded and 9,721 missing from 1 October to 10 January, but many argue these understate the real losses; Chris Bellamy, counting through to April, estimates about 500,000, and the Russian historian Vladimir Litvinenko more than a million. The Wehrmacht is reported to have lost 1,300 tanks, 2,500 guns and over 15,000 vehicles. 1 2 3
But the battle's weight lies not only in numbers. Before Moscow the German army suffered its first major defeat of the war. Barbarossa's aim of defeating the Soviet Union in 1941 collapsed, and Blitzkrieg, the method of overwhelming an opponent in a short war of manoeuvre, showed its limits in the east. The war became a long contest of industry and manpower, and the Soviet Union gained time to restart the factories it had moved east. With the United States entering the war that same December, the anti-Hitler coalition took shape. Władysław Sikorski, prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile, who met Stalin in early December, told the British ambassador that the Russians would fight on whatever the fate of Moscow. Vasilevsky judged that the victory broke, for the first time, the aura of invincibility around the German army. 3 1 15
The battle also exposed the Soviet side's limits. Army Group Centre was not destroyed, the Rzhev–Vyazma salient went on threatening Moscow, and the question of the strategic initiative was put off to the summer of 1942. Excessive expectations born of the success at Moscow played their part in the new Soviet disaster at Kharkov in spring 1942 and the German drive south that led to Stalingrad. The defence of Moscow became a Soviet symbol of resistance: the medal 'For the Defence of Moscow' was instituted on 1 May 1944 and awarded to more than a million people, and Moscow received the title Hero City in 1965. In Russia today 5 December, when the counteroffensive began, and 7 November, the day of the parade, are days of military glory. Meanwhile wartime stories such as 'Panfilov's Twenty-Eight' were revived in a government-backed film in 2016, and together with the German explanation of 'General Winter' they show how the memory of this battle remains entangled with politics. 1 6 8 2
Consequences
Germany failed to achieve Barbarossa's aim of defeating the Soviet Union in 1941, suffered its first major defeat and purged its command, and the war turned into a prolonged war of attrition. The Soviet Union held its capital and recovered all of the Moscow and Tula regions and parts of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions, but did not destroy Army Group Centre; the Rzhev–Vyazma salient remained as a costly battleground until March 1943. Official Soviet irrecoverable losses come to about 930,000; estimates of German losses range from several hundred thousand to more than a million depending on the source.
Timeline & Map
- 11941.09.30Operation Typhoon begins
Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group struck first from the Glukhov area toward Oryol; the main body of Army Group Centre followed two days later.
- 21941.10.02Army Group Centre attacks
Army Group Centre's infantry armies and 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups broke through the Western and Reserve Fronts and drove on Vyazma from north and south.
- 31941.10.03Oryol falls
Mechanised units of the 2nd Panzer Group entered Oryol and pushed on north along the road to Tula.
- 1941.10.05Rokossovsky's 'unexpected order'
The Western Front ordered 16th Army commander Rokossovsky to hand over his troops and take only his staff to Vyazma to organise a counterstroke. When he arrived the next afternoon, the promised divisions were not there and German tanks entered the town.
- 41941.10.06Ambush at Mtsensk
Katukov's tank brigade of Lelyushenko's 1st Guards Special Rifle Corps ambushed a battlegroup of the German 4th Panzer Division from the woods near Mtsensk.
- 51941.10.06Bryansk taken
The German 17th Panzer Division entered Bryansk from the rear; the Bryansk Front's three armies had to break out eastward from encirclement.
- 61941.10.07Vyazma pocket closes
The 3rd Panzer Group from the north and 4th from the south met at Vyazma, encircling 37 divisions including the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies, which fought on until about 13 October.
- 1941.10.10Zhukov takes the Western Front
Recalled from Leningrad, Zhukov took command of the Western Front, now merged with the Reserve Front, with Konev as his deputy.
- 71941.10.14Kalinin falls
German forces took Kalinin. Three days later the Stavka grouped the three armies on this axis into a new Kalinin Front under Konev.
- 81941.10.15Evacuation of Moscow ordered
The State Defence Committee adopted decree No. 801 moving government bodies, the General Staff and embassies from Moscow to Kuibyshev and other cities; panic gripped the city for the next three days.
- 1941.10.16Attack on the Volokolamsk axis
German armour attacked Ivan Panfilov's 316th Rifle Division on the left wing of the 16th Army.
- 91941.10.18Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets fall
German forces took Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets, two strongpoints of the Mozhaisk line.
- 1941.10.20State of siege in Moscow
Under its decision of the previous day, the State Defence Committee placed Moscow and its suburbs under a state of siege; panic-mongers and looters could be shot on the spot.
- 101941.10.27Volokolamsk falls
German forces took Volokolamsk with a large tank force; an attempt to cut the road to Istra was stopped by Pliyev's cavalry division.
- 111941.10.29First assault on Tula repulsed
Guderian's forces reached Tula, but remnants of the 50th Army, an NKVD regiment and the Tula workers' regiment held off three days of attacks.
- 1941.11.07Red Square parade
The parade for the 24th anniversary of the Revolution was held at 8 a.m., two hours earlier than usual. Budyonny took the salute, Stalin spoke, and the units marched straight on to the front.
- 121941.11.16Dubosekovo
On the first day of the second German offensive, the 2nd Panzer Division attacked and overran the positions of the 4th Company, 1075th Rifle Regiment, near the Dubosekovo halt.
- 1941.11.18Panfilov killed
Ivan Panfilov, commander of the 316th Rifle Division, was killed at his observation post, hours after his division was made the 8th Guards Rifle Division.
- 131941.11.23Klin falls
The German 3rd Panzer Group took Klin; Solnechnogorsk fell the same day.
- 141941.11.26Istra falls
The German 4th Panzer Group took Istra; two days earlier Soviet troops had blown the sluices of the Istra reservoir, flooding the ground to the south.
- 151941.11.27Yakhroma bridgehead
The German 7th Panzer Division crossed the Moscow–Volga Canal by an unblown bridge at Yakhroma, but was driven back the next day by a counterattack of the 1st Shock Army.
- 1941.11.30Counteroffensive plan approved
Zhukov sent the Western Front counteroffensive plan to the General Staff, asking that it be put to Stalin at once; Stalin approved it.
- 161941.12.02Reconnaissance at Khimki
A German reconnaissance unit reached the canal bridge and railway station at Khimki, the closest the Germans came to Moscow.
- 171941.12.05Soviet counteroffensive begins
The Kalinin Front attacked; the Western Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front followed the next day.
- 1941.12.08Hitler's Directive No. 39
Hitler signed Directive No. 39 ordering the whole Eastern Front over to the defensive.
- 1941.12.16Kalinin retaken, Tula relieved
The Soviet 29th and 31st Armies retook Kalinin and the threat to Tula was lifted in the south; the same day Hitler forbade large-scale withdrawals.
- 1941.12.19Brauchitsch dismissed
Hitler dismissed Brauchitsch as commander-in-chief of the army and took command himself; Kluge replaced Bock at Army Group Centre.
- 1942.01.05General offensive decided
At a Kremlin meeting Stalin announced simultaneous offensives on every axis from Leningrad to the Crimea; the plan was adopted over Zhukov's objections.
- 181942.01.08Rzhev–Vyazma operation begins
Under the Stavka directive of 7 January the Kalinin Front attacked northwest of Rzhev; the Western Front joined two days later.
- 191942.01.29Sukhinichi retaken
Moved south, Rokossovsky's 16th Army command took over 10th Army units and retook Sukhinichi.
- 1942.04.20Shift to the defensive
The Kalinin and Western Fronts were ordered onto the defensive along the Rzhev–Gzhatsk–Kirov–Zhizdra line; the 33rd Army, encircled near Vyazma, had already been destroyed.
Related people 33
Soviet Union (Red Army)23
Implementers & commanders7
Commanded the Western Front from 10 October through the Mozhaisk line and the November defence, then planned and led the counteroffensive; reportedly opposed the January general offensive. Clashed with Rokossovsky over a withdrawal to the Istra line.
Head of Operations and Deputy Chief of the General StaffAleksandr Vasilevsky1895–1977Led the operations group that stayed in Moscow after the General Staff evacuated on 16 October, put the counteroffensive plan to Stalin and drafted the directives.
Chief of the General StaffBoris Shaposhnikov1882–1945Headed the evacuated General Staff and returned in late November to prepare the counteroffensive; according to Rokossovsky he approved the 16th Army's proposed withdrawal to the Istra line.
Commander of the Western Front, then of the Kalinin FrontIvan Konev1897–1973Commanded the Western Front when it was encircled at Vyazma, then from 17 October led the Kalinin Front, which opened the counteroffensive on 5 December.
Commander of the 16th ArmyKonstantin Rokossovsky1896–1968Escaped the Vyazma encirclement with his staff, defended the Volokolamsk and Istra axes, and led the December counteroffensive and the retaking of Sukhinichi in January 1942; described the battle in his memoir A Soldier's Duty.
Commander of the 5th ArmyLeonid Govorov1897–1955Took over the 5th Army on the Mozhaisk axis after Lelyushenko was wounded and held the Minsk highway approach.
Commander of the 1st Guards Special Rifle Corps, later of the 30th ArmyDmitry Lelyushenko1901–1987Slowed Guderian's advance at Mtsensk in early October, then commanded the 30th Army north of Klin and in the December counteroffensive.
Participants15
Commanded the Reserve Front until 8 October and took the salute at the Red Square parade of 7 November.
Commander-in-chief of the Southwestern DirectionSemyon Timoshenko1895–1970During the December counteroffensive his Southwestern Front's right wing attacked at Yelets, supporting the Western Front's southern flank.
Tank brigade commanderMikhail Katukov1900–1976Made his name in the Mtsensk ambush, fought with the 16th Army on the Volokolamsk and Istra axes and in December led the mobile group that bypassed the Istra reservoir from the south.
Commander of the 316th Rifle DivisionIvan Panfilov1893–1941Held the Volokolamsk axis on the 16th Army's left wing and was killed by mortar fragments at Gusenevo on 18 November; the same day the division became the 8th Guards Rifle Division, and on the 23rd it was named after him.
Commander of the 78th Rifle DivisionAfanasy Beloborodov1903–1990Brought his division from Siberia and fought with the 16th Army on the Istra axis in November; the division became the 9th Guards Rifle Division in late November, and in the December counteroffensive it crossed the Istra and retook the town.
Artillery commander of the 16th ArmyVasily Kazakov (marshal of artillery)1898–1968Commanded Rokossovsky's artillery in the Volokolamsk and Istra defence, shifting guns to threatened points to stop German tanks.
Cavalry corps commanderLev Dovator1903–1941Brought his cavalry group out of encirclement to hold north of Volokolamsk and the Solnechnogorsk axis; killed during the December counteroffensive.
Commander of the 50th Cavalry DivisionIssa Pliyev1903–1979Held the Istra road east of Volokolamsk on 27 October and struck the German flank at Skirmanovo in November.
Chief of staff of the Western FrontVasily Sokolovsky1897–1968According to Vasilevsky, contributed much to the counteroffensive plan Zhukov submitted on 30 November.
Chief of staff of the 16th ArmyMikhail Malinin1899–1960Rokossovsky's chief of staff through the escape from Vyazma, the defence of Volokolamsk and Istra and the December counteroffensive.
Commander of the Bryansk FrontAndrei Yeryomenko1892–1970Ordered his armies to break out eastward when the Bryansk Front was encircled at the start of Typhoon.
Commander of the 33rd ArmyMikhail Gr. Yefremov1897–1942Restored the Nara line in December; encircled near Vyazma during the Rzhev–Vyazma operation, he died in April 1942.
Commander of the 20th ArmyAndrey Vlasov1901–1946Led the 20th Army, brought in from the Stavka reserve, against the Solnechnogorsk axis in the December counteroffensive.
Commander of the 10th ArmyFilipp Golikov1900–1980Led the 10th Army, formed around Ryazan, in the southern counterstroke; after a German counterattack in January 1942 its units were placed under Rokossovsky.
First secretary of the Moscow party organisationAlexander Shcherbakov1901–1945Went on the radio on 17 October to deny rumours that Moscow would be surrendered.
Germany (Wehrmacht)10
Implementers & commanders5
Argued early for a direct thrust on Moscow and widened the Typhoon plan along his own lines; in December authorised a limited withdrawal together with Kluge.
Commander of the 2nd Panzer Group (2nd Panzer Army)Heinz Guderian1888–1954Diverted to the Kiev encirclement, then advanced from the south on Oryol, Tula and Kashira but never took Tula; dismissed at the end of December after withdrawing without orders.
Commander of the 4th Army, then of Army Group CentreGünther von Kluge1882–1944Held the western front of the attack with the 4th Army and in December replaced Bock at Army Group Centre.
Commander of the 3rd Panzer GroupHermann Hoth1885–1971Led the northern pincer of the Vyazma encirclement before moving to Army Group South in late October.
Commander of Army Group CentreFedor von Bock1880–1945Led Operation Typhoon to within 30 km of Moscow, was thrown back by the December counteroffensive and replaced by Kluge.
Participants4
Provided air support for Typhoon until much of his air fleet was transferred to the Mediterranean in November.
Commander of the 9th Army (from January 1942)Walter Model1891–1945Took over the 9th Army in January 1942 and held the Rzhev area against the Soviet winter offensive.
Corps commander, later commander of the 4th ArmyGotthard Heinrici1886–1971Criticised the high command in a December letter to his wife for pressing the attack without winter supplies; took over the 4th Army in January 1942.
Commander-in-Chief of the ArmyWalther von Brauchitsch1881–1948Argued for a direct attack on Moscow; dismissed on 19 December, after which Hitler took command of the Army himself.
Related terms
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19